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Abstract
For integration between application-systems in a global context, interoperability 
needs to be established on a global level; global interoperability, in turn, is based 
on a global common application-interface. This is achieved through resolving 
differences in, inter alia, protocol profiles, among participants in the global 
network.
ebXML is used as the point of departure. A messaging framework, which is based 
on existing Web technology and standards, is proposed. Certain security and Web 
service standards are examined to determine specific parameters for an 
interoperable secure messaging environment. A security based framework 
comprising a predefined message format and architecture is investigated for a 
secure interoperable global electronic marketspace.
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2Chapter 1
Introduction
For integration between application-systems in a global context, 
interoperability needs to be established on a global level; global interoperability, 
in turn, is based on a global common application-interface; this is achieved 
through resolving differences in, inter alia, protocol profiles, among participants 
in the global network.
Electronic business XML (ebXML) represents such an initiative by the 
United Nations Centre for Trade Facilitation and Electronic Business 
(UN/CEFACT) and Organization for the Advancement of Structured Information 
Standards (OASIS) (Schlegel, 2003). The purpose of ebXML was to research and 
identify the technical basis upon which the global implementation of Extensible 
Markup Language (XML) could be standardized. The primary aim of ebXML was 
to use a standardized XML grammar within an open architecture for conducting 
electronic business in business-to-business (B2B) and business-to-consumer 
(B2C) environments (Rawlings, 2001).
Rawlings (2001) states that ebXML was not about creating standard 
schemas or XML Document Type Definitions (DTDs) for common business 
documents, such as purchase orders and invoices, but was instead about creating 
an infrastructure. Despite the fact that creating an infrastructure is more 
technically-challenging, developing an XML vocabulary for business documents 
would have been more appropriate, for establishing a “common-transaction” 
platform. With the current ebXML model, the problem of interoperability arises 
when different major companies start to develop ebXML implementations. It is 
challenging for the different implementations, without standardized business 
processes and standardized business document types, to process one another’s 
documents.
3In an ebXML environment, businesses publish their own collaboration 
protocol profiles (CPPs), which describe the technical specifications of their 
business systems. A CPP outlines the specific processes, interface details, and 
protocols which a company can use to conduct business. Details such as quality-
of-service levels that a company is capable of maintaining are included within a 
CPP. Two companies that want to engage in business need to merge their CPPs to 
create a mutually-agreed-upon collaborative protocol agreement (CPA). This is 
essentially the solution of ebXML for helping trading partners to standardize both 
technical and business issues. The CPA data is used to programmatically 
negotiate run-time parameters (Borck, 2001). In a many-to-many situation, this 
becomes difficult. In addition, individual companies can submit their own 
business process specifications. ebXML, therefore, like other business integration 
models, supports mutual arrangements between trading partners, but makes a 
global solution difficult. 
Business partners must be able to exchange information and services in an 
automated fashion in accordance with the above CPAs. The ebXML Messaging 
Service specification defines the set of services and protocols that lets E-business 
applications exchange data. It allows for the use of any application-level protocol 
and cryptographic techniques to implement strong security, confidentiality and 
authenticity (Kiely, 2001).
1.1 Problem Statement
Although ebXML is based on existing and well-known technologies, it is 
impossible to make all the technologies interact seamlessly with each other. Many 
different implementation options are allowed within the ebXML Messaging 
Specification, to allow for flexibility in integration options. This, paradoxically, 
jeopardizes interoperability, which is the main goal of ebXML. The possible 
number of permutations of CPAs will be vast in a global context.
It seems logical to infer that application interface-interoperability can be 
implemented by either using a global “gateway” or by replacing all configurable 
4parameters with a predefined global standard. However, the global standard must 
first satisfy the requirements for global interoperability.
Gateways (Translators) are an expensive solution - even in programmatic 
terms - to enable communication between a great number of possible different 
application-system platforms. It appears that the use of the “same interoperable 
technologies and standards” concept would seem more preferable.
A critical matter is security interoperability within a global integration 
solution. This dissertation focuses on security integration within a global context, 
specifically as it relates to a common message architecture. It attempts to answer 
the question: Can a common, message architecture be designed to promote global 
security interoperability in application-to-application communication?
1.2 Objectives
The objective of this study is to propose a messaging framework which is 
based on existing Web technologies and standards. The use of specific security 
standards is examined to determine specific parameters for an interoperable, 
secure messaging environment. A security-based framework comprising a 
predefined message format and message architecture is investigated.
1.3 Methodology
A literature survey is done to gain more knowledge and to make 
inferences from the work of experts in this field. A framework is developed to 
provide guidelines for the implementation of the proposed messaging 
environment in a global electronic market place.
1.4 The Dissertation at a Glance
In this dissertation, a transportation analogy is used, which assumes an 
internal network of roads where transportation is standardized by international 
5agreements. The latter provide standards for protocols, vehicles, cargo, etc. These 
standards equate to those used for the messaging infrastructure, which includes 
media, protocols, hosts, etc. Web services are the technology of choice to 
facilitate an interoperable messaging interface. A message handler Web service is 
compared to a vehicle depot. Authorized vehicles can be sent out to deliver a 
request-for-goods or to deliver requested goods at other depots, and vice versa; 
the depot can receive a request for goods or actual requested goods.
A Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP) message is the vehicle sent or 
received by the Web service (vehicle depot). The goods or requests-for-goods that 
are delivered will typically be XML business documents – although not 
exclusively so - which are carried by the SOAP message (vehicle). The vehicle 
transports goods (XML business documents) from one depot to other depots.
In Chapter 2, the focus is on the Vehicle Depot (the standardized message 
handler Web services), outlining the different technologies involved and how this 
technology can be used to solve the (security) interoperability problem.
Once a depot is established, the vehicles must be sent to specific places to 
deliver requests-for-goods or requested goods. Before a vehicle can go anywhere, 
it needs to know its destination. Chapter 3 discusses standardized elements to use 
for specifying endpoint addresses to which vehicles must go. This standardized 
addressing method allows the routing of the vehicles between the different depots.
It is important to realize that the vehicle carries important business-related 
information when the vehicle is ready to go on the road. It is crucial that the 
transportation mechanism is reliable and that delivery will be assured. Chapter 4 
equips the vehicle with the necessary standardized elements that will ensure 
guaranteed delivery of goods.
At this stage, a reliable vehicle is available which knows its destination. 
However, the vehicle, typically, travels on a very unsafe road. This road equates 
to the Internet, an Extranet or an Intranet zone. Chapter 7 focuses on two chosen 
methods to secure the road on which the vehicle travels. The two methods 
discussed represent state-of-the-art virtual private network protocols.
6Once the road is secured, it does not mean that the vehicle is secure after it 
reaches the destination depot. The secure road only offers a safe trip from the 
origin to the destination.
In Chapter 5, the spotlight is on how the vehicle can be secured so that it 
cannot be hijacked and how to allow the goods to be examined by authorized 
entities, etc.
When all security aspects have been covered, the vehicles can travel safely 
on the road. It is also important that the vehicles arrive at their destination as 
quickly as possible. Certain type of goods might slow the vehicles down. Chapter 
6 discusses different techniques which can be used to optimize the vehicle and the 
cargo for optimum performance.
Finally, Chapters 8 and 9 combine all the previous chapters and propose a 
secure interoperable messaging environment for a global electronic marketplace.
7Part II
Background
8Chapter 2
International Transportation Mechanism 
(Protocol Suite)
The Web (Internet) is becoming an integral part of daily business life. 
Electronic mail and Web applications are used more and more in conducting 
business. Reliable and trustworthy services are two key words that are very 
important when businesses seek a competitive edge; secure, reliable transportation 
of messages comprise an important part of this.
There are several trends towards which the Web is moving. Content 
requested for business transactions is becoming more dynamic, bandwidth is 
getting cheaper, storage is getting cheaper and pervasive computing is becoming 
more important (Tidwell, 2001).
The Web is based on certain technologies such as:
 Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP), which 
is the universal networking protocol through which many devices, 
ranging from pagers, mobile phones, laptops to mainframes, can 
communicate;
 Hypertext Markup Language (HTML) is the universal interface for 
formatting information to be displayed on many modern devices;
 Java is a well known platform-independent language for universal 
code on the Web;
 Extensible Markup Language (XML) is one of the newer 
technologies used to describe universal data in a structured way.
All these technologies have certain things in common. They are all open, 
cross-platform standards. It is the openness that makes the Web possible and 
forms the foundation for Web services (Ibid).
9Web services can be used to facilitate certain functionality and use the 
above-mentioned trends to their advantage, because they provide a set of 
integrated solutions for customized services that are delivered through the Web. 
They enable dynamic discovery, composition, negotiation and delivery of services 
(Ratnasingam, 2004).
“Web service” needs defining. A formal definition by Booth, Haas, 
McCabe, Newcomer, Champion, Ferris, & Orchard (2004) states that “A Web 
service is a software system designed to support interoperable machine-to-
machine interaction over a network. It has an interface described in a machine-
processable format (specifically Web Services Description Language (WSDL)). 
Other systems interact with the Web service in a manner prescribed by its 
description using SOAP messages, typically conveyed using Hypertext Transfer 
Protocol (HTTP) with an XML serialization in conjunction with other Web-
related standards”.
If the previous definition is examined then the following can be reasoned:
 Web services follow in the footsteps of object-oriented 
programming which makes them reusable software components. 
Therefore, one well-defined service can be used by many entities 
and it is not necessary to reinvent the wheel;
 Web services are loosely-coupled software components. This 
requires a much simpler level of coordination and allows for 
flexible reconfiguration. This will allow for easy adoption of a 
service within an organization structure;
 Web services semantically encapsulate discrete functionality. It 
describes its own inputs and outputs and for this reason enables 
other software components to interact with it;
 Web services can be accessed programmatically. They operate at 
code level, where there is no direct human interaction, but rather 
system-to-system interaction;
 Web services are distributed over the Internet, using existing 
protocols and are compliant with most current infrastructures.
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With a mechanism that supports interoperability, based on existing 
standards, a service can be created to facilitate secure messaging. Web services 
are rapidly becoming the de facto standard for the enabling technology for the e-
business and e-commerce systems of today (Ratnasingam, 2004).
Web services do not enable new kinds of computational capability. They 
still run on existing computers, executing the same set of instructions and 
accessing the same data (Ferguson, Storey, Lovering, & Shewchuk, 2003). They 
represent a new platform on which distributed applications can be build with 
interoperability as the main focus (Skonnard, 2002). In the vehicle analogy, Web 
services represent an International Protocol Agreement for passing messages in a 
seamless (interoperable) fashion.
In the next section, the focus will be on the components that comprise the 
architecture of Web services, including the standards that are used to build, secure 
and manage these services.
2.1 Web Service Architecture
The Web service architecture is, at its core, a way for applications to 
integrate with one another through the intelligent interchange of messages. The 
architecture does not imply how Web services should be implemented, but 
primarily promotes interoperability (Booth et al., 2004). 
The basic Web service platform consists of HTTP and XML.  HTTP is a 
ubiquitous protocol, running practically everywhere on the Internet (Vasudevan, 
2001).  XML provides a metalanguage in which specialized specifications can be 
written to express complex interactions between clients and services or between 
components of a composite service. The XML message is converted into a 
middleware request and the result converted back to XML behind the façade of a 
Web server (Bray, Paoli, Sperberg-McQueen, Maler, & Yergeau, 2004).
The Web needs to be enhanced with a few other platforms services, which 
maintain the ubiquity and simplicity of the Web, to constitute a more functional 
platform. A full-functional platform can consist of XML, HTTP, SOAP, 
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Universal Description, Discovery and Integration Service (UDDI) and WSDL. At 
higher levels even more technologies can be added, such as XML Key 
Management Specification (XKMS) (Vasudevan, 2001).
Figure 1: The Web Services Technology Stack (Sleeper & Robins, 2004)
Figure 1 illustrates the Web services technology stack. SOAP, XML and 
common Internet protocols make up the core layers of a Web service.
2.1.1 Core Layers of the Web Service Stack
The core layers that define basic Web services communication have been 
widely accepted and will likely be implemented quite uniformly. The first layer of 
the core is the common Internet protocols. Web services are not tied to specific 
transport protocols. They build on ubiquitous Internet connectivity and 
infrastructure to ensure nearly universal reach and support. It is generally assumed 
that Web Services will generally take advantage of HTTP, the same connection 
protocol used by Web servers and browsers. A study is done on Internet Protocol 
Security (IPSec) and Secure Socket Layer Protocol/Transport Layer Security 
(SSL/TLS) with respect to adding security at this level. Refer to Chapter 7 
(Sleeper & Robins, 2004).
The XML layer is a widely accepted format for exchanging data and its 
corresponding semantics. It is a fundamental building block for nearly every other 
layer in the Web service stack (Ibid).
The Web service architecture is built with SOAP messages as the atomic 
unit of communication. It assumes SOAP as the lowest layer in the protocol stack 
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and isolates message transfer from the transport details. This allows for service 
interoperability among development platforms, and provides for richer 
communication patterns (Cabrera, Kurt, & Box, 2004).
The SOAP layer is a lightweight protocol for messaging and Remote 
Procedure Call (RPC)-style communication between applications. It is based on 
XML and uses common Internet transport protocols like HTTP to carry its data 
(Sleeper & Robins, 2004). In the common analogy, SOAP is the standardized 
vehicle used for transporting goods (messages) between Web service requestors 
and Web service providers.
A SOAP message is basically a one-way transmission between SOAP 
nodes, from a SOAP sender to a SOAP receiver. However, SOAP messages can 
be used in a more complex manner such as interaction patterns ranging from 
request/response to multiple, back-and-forth conversational exchanges (Mitra, 
2003).
A SOAP message traveling from the sender to the ultimate receiver may 
pass through other SOAP intermediaries, which act in some way on the message. 
SOAP intermediary examples are ones that log, audit, or possibly modify some 
requests (messages). SOAP intermediaries can provide value added services to a 
specific message (Ibid).
Figure 2: A SOAP Envelope containing a SOAP Header and SOAP Body (Ibid)
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The SOAP message contains two SOAP-specific sub-elements within the 
overall <Envelope> element, namely a <Header> and a <Body>. Refer to Figure 
2.
The <Header> element is optional. It is an extension mechanism that 
provides a means to pass information in SOAP messages, such as processing 
instructions. Headers can be viewed, added or deleted by SOAP intermediaries. 
Each header block is defined in its own XML namespace which represents some 
aspect pertaining to the overall processing of the body of the SOAP message 
(Ibid).
The <Body> is the mandatory element within the SOAP Envelope. It is 
where the main end-to-end information is carried. The choice of what data is 
placed in the header or the body is completely up to the developers (Ibid). In the 
analogy, SOAP represents the vehicle. The SOAP Body is the cargo area into 
which transported goods will be loaded. The SOAP Header contains all the 
documentation (permits, addresses, etc.) that is needed to transport the goods. It is 
important that these documents are standardized to ensure a common international 
understanding, to promote interoperability.
As mentioned, SOAP messages are used for communication between Web 
services. The paramount need is that the communications are described in a 
structured way, providing a robust development and operational environment. The 
WSDL protocol handles this function and will be discussed in the next section.
2.1.2 Higher-Level Layers of the Web Service Stack
2.1.2.1 WSDL
In simple terms, WSDL describes the actual service provided at a 
particular provider (vehicle depot), using a universal language: XML. WSDL 
service definitions equate to documentation for distributed systems and serve as a 
recipe for automating the creation of Web service clients (requesting vehicle 
depot). WSDL describes the basic characteristics of a Web service (Christensen, 
Curbera, Meredith, & Weerawarana, 2001).
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The method that WSDL uses to describe message formats is based on the 
XML Schema standard. It is both programming-language neutral and standards-
based which makes it suitable for describing XML Web service interfaces that are 
accessible from a wide variety of platforms and programming languages. WSDL 
defines where the service is available and what communication protocols are 
used. This enables a developer to interact with a Web service, because its 
location, methods, type of inputs and outputs, protocols, etc. are known (Wolter, 
2001).
WSDL defines services (depots) as collections of network endpoints or 
ports. WSDL allows the abstract definition of endpoints and messages separate 
from their concrete network deployment or data format binding. This allows the 
reuse of abstract definitions of messages – the abstract description of the data 
being exchanged, and port types – the abstract collection of operations. The 
concrete protocol and data format specifications for a particular port type 
constitute a reusable binding. A port is defined by associating a network address 
with a reusable binding. A collection of ports defines a service (Vasudevan, 
2001). A WSDL document uses the following elements in the definition of 
network services (Christensen et al., 2001):
 Types – a container for data type definitions using some type 
system (such as XML Schema Definition (XSD));
 Message – an abstract, typed definition of the data being 
communicated;
 Operation – an abstract description of an action supported by the 
service;
 Port Type – an abstract set of operations supported by one or more 
endpoints;
 Binding – a concrete protocol and data format specification for a 
particular port type;
 Port – a single endpoint defined as a combination of a binding and 
a network address;
 Service – a collection of related endpoints.
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The additional information that is layered by WSDL over the XSD 
describes the actual message. This extra information makes it possible for toolkits 
to automatically generate proxy and stub classes able to invoke Web service 
operations without much developer intervention. WSDL documents promote 
interoperability (Skonnard, 2002).
WSDL is not sufficient to describe all aspects of a Web service. Other 
metadata specifications need to be implemented with WSDL (Cabrera et al., 
2004). These specifications are beyond the scope of this dissertation.
Once a Web service is implemented, described and deployed, it would be 
helpful if it were easy for other entities to find and use it. Universal Description, 
Discovery and Integration Service (UDDI) provides a mechanism for clients to 
dynamically find other Web services. It can be seen as the “yellow pages” of Web 
services. The UDDI registry can be searched to find a service to satisfy specific 
needs (Wolter, 2001). This is similar to finding a depot that provides a particular 
service.
2.1.2.2 UDDI
Thus, UDDI can be seen as a registry of possible service providers. 
Businesses can dynamically connect to services provided by external business 
partners using a UDDI interface. A UDDI registry is similar to a Common Object 
Request Broker Architecture (CORBA) trader, or it can be thought of as a 
Domain Name Server (DNS) service for business applications. A UDDI registry 
has two kinds of clients: businesses that want to publish a service (and its usage 
interfaces), and clients who want to obtain services of a certain kind and bind 
programmatically to them (Vasudevan, 2001).
A UDDI Registry contains information about businesses and the services 
they offer. The information is organized as follows (Systinet, 2003):
 Business Entity – Who owns this depot? A business entity 
contains information about the business including its name, a short 
description, and some basic contact information. Each business can 
be associated with unique business identifiers, including a Thomas 
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Register identifier and a Data Universal Numbering System 
(DUNS) number, and with a list of categorization which describes 
the business;
 Business Service – What are the services on offer at this depot? 
Associated with the Business Entity is a list of business services 
offered by the business entity. Each business service entry contains 
a business description of the service, a list of categories that 
describe the service, and a list of binding templates that point to 
technical information about the service.
 Binding Templates – Where is this depot and how can it be 
accessed? Associated with each Business Service entry is a list of 
Binding Templates that provide information on the location and 
use of the service. For example, a Binding Template may contain 
the access point of the service implementation and a pointer to the 
WSDL document that describes the service. The Binding Template 
associates the Business Service with a Service Type;
 Service Types – What type of services are offered at this depot? A 
Service Type, defined by a construct called a tModel, defines an 
abstract service. Multiple businesses can offer the same type of 
service, all supporting the same service interface. A tModel 
specifies information such as the tModel name, the name of the 
organization that published the tModel, a list of categories that 
describes the tModel, and pointers to technical specifications for 
the tModel. For example, a tModel may point to a WSDL 
document that describes an abstract service type.
Figure 3 illustrates the relationships between the UDDI registry, WSDL 
document, the actual Web service and the consumer. The UDDI service itself can 
be seen as a Web service. Users communicate with UDDI using SOAP messages. 
After a service is identified in the UDDI registry, the associated WSDL document 
can be retrieved which describes how to interact with the specific Web service. 
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This enables the developer to create a SOAP client interface that will interact with 
the Web service (Ibid).
Figure 3: UDDI
2.1.2.3 Other Business Rules
The standardized vehicle (SOAP) and the International Transportation 
Agreement would obviously require being extended for suitability in all 
transport/business contexts. Additional elements that support complex business 
rules must still be implemented before Web services can automate truly critical 
business processes. Mechanisms for security and authentication, contract 
management, quality of service, etc. are found at this level. Examples are WS-
Security, WS-Trust, WS-SecureConversation, WS-ReliableMessaging, etc.
These standards are examined in Section 2.2 with a brief description of 
each.
2.2 Web Service Standards
More functionality and capability is expected from Web services; but 
interoperability is still the number one factor. Each developed specification solves 
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an immediate need and is valuable in its own right. Nevertheless, although each 
specification stands on its own, they are designed to be combined and 
interoperable (Ferguson et al., 2003).
Figure 4: Web service specification architecture (Microsoft MSDN, 2005)
Figure 4 illustrates the Web service specification architecture 
demonstrating how the different specifications fit in with each other. As 
previously discussed, XML forms the basis of Web services.
When focusing on the Messaging level of Web services, different 
specifications are involved. The SOAP version 1.2 specification is endorsed as the 
standard Web services messaging protocol (Mitra, 2003).  The WS-Addressing 
provides transport-neutral mechanisms to address Web services and messages 
(Hadley & Gudgin, 2005). The Message Transmission Optimization Mechanism 
(MTOM) specification describes a mechanism for optimizing a SOAP message by 
selectively re-encoding portions of the message, while still presenting an XML 
Information Set to the SOAP application (Gudgin, Mendelsohn, Nottingham, & 
Ruellan, 2005a). Specifications such as WS-Enumeration, WS-Eventing, WS-
Transfer and SOAP-over-UDP are developed by Microsoft but are currently not 
W3C standards.
One of the more important specifications is certainly the Web Services 
Security Specification (WS-Security). This specification describes enhancements 
to SOAP messages to provide the necessary security, such as integrity, 
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confidentiality and single message authentication. This specification provides a 
general-purpose, but extensible, mechanism for associating security tokens with 
messages. This specification is based on the XML Digital Signature and XML 
Encryption specifications (Nadalin, Kaler, Hallam-Baker, & Monzillo, 2004). 
Other specifications that build onto the WS-Security specification or which 
provide additional security implementation are WS-Security: UsernameToken 
Profile, WS-Security: X.509 Certificate Token Profile, WS-SecureConversation, 
WS-SecurityPolicy, WS-Trust, WS-Federation, WS-Federation Active Requestor 
Profile, WS-Federation Passive Requestor Profile, WS-Security: Kerberos 
Binding, Web Single Sign-On Interoperability Profile and Web Single Sign-On 
Metadata Exchange Protocol. 
Reliable Messaging is achieved by implementing the WS-
ReliableMessaging specification. This specification describes a protocol that 
allows messages to be delivered reliably between distributed applications in the 
presence of software component, system, or network failures. This specification is 
transport neutral and can be implemented using different network transport 
technologies. This protocol guarantees that messages are delivered, correctly 
ordered and received without duplication. The WS-RM Policy specification 
describes a policy assertion that leverages the WS-Policy framework, enabling the 
RM Source and Destination to describe their requirements for reliable message 
exchange (Microsoft MSDN, 2005).
Transaction specifications describe coordination types as given in the WS-
Coordination specification. This specification provides protocols that coordinate 
actions of distributed systems. Two coordination types are defined; Atomic 
Transaction and Business Activity. These are defined in the WS-
AtomicTransaction and WS-BusinessActivity specifications respectively (Ibid).
The Metadata specifications include the WSDL, WS-Policy, WS-
PolicyAssertions, WS-PolicyAttachment, WS-Discovery and WS-
MetadataExchange specifications. The Policy specifications define general-
purpose models and syntax to describe and communicate the policies of a Web 
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service. The WS-MetadataExchange defines messages to retrieve specific types of 
metadata associated with an endpoint (Ibid).
Management specifications, which include WS-Management and WS-
Management Catalog, are developed by Microsoft to manage systems and devices 
(Ibid).
Businesses implementing Web services require a model for describing 
how individual Web services can be interconnected to create a complex, reliable, 
and trustworthy business solution. The Business Process Execution Language for 
Web Services (BPEL4WS) enables the description of business processes (Ibid).
Web services profile specifications, which are WS-I Basic Profile and 
Devices Profile, are proposed with clear guidance on how to develop services in 
order to improve interoperability (Ibid).
Web services standards, according to Ratnasingam (2004), are playing an 
important role, because they dramatically simplify and streamline information 
management. Many of these specifications need to be implemented in the 
proposed framework. Such specifications will be WS-Addressing, WS-Security, 
etc.
Web services and its related technologies have been discussed thus far. 
Next, a brief look at the benefits of Web services will highlight its importance in 
secure, interoperable business-messaging.
2.3 Benefits of Web Services
Box et al. (2003) state that many companies are using Web services in 
production environments. This is because there are benefits to be gained from 
these Web services and not because it is a new industry-hype.
Web services promote interoperability. The interaction between a service 
provider and a service requester is designed to be completely platform- and 
language-independent. A WSDL document defines the interface and describes the 
service to enable interactions, together with a network protocol (usually HTTP). 
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Interoperability is a given, because the service provider and the service requester 
are ignorant of what platforms or languages each other are using (Tidwell, 2001).
Web services enable just-in-time integration. Service requesters use 
service brokers to find service providers and the discovery takes place 
dynamically. Once the requester and provider have found each other, the WSDL 
document of the provider is used to bind the requester and the service together. 
This means that requesters, providers, and brokers work together to create 
systems that are self-configuring, adaptive, and robust. When interoperability is 
achieved then integration will follow shortly in its footsteps (Ibid).
Web services reduce complexity through encapsulation. Service requesters 
and providers concern themselves with the interfaces necessary to interact with 
each other. Consequently, the service requester has no idea how the service 
provider implements its service, vice versa. These details are encapsulated inside 
the requesters and providers Web services. This encapsulation is crucial for 
reducing complexity (Ibid).
Web services give new life to legacy applications. It is relatively straight-
forward to take an application, generate a SOAP wrapper, and generate a WSDL 
document to cast the application as a Web service. This means that legacy 
applications can be used in interesting new ways. In addition, the infrastructure 
associated with legacy applications (security, directory services, transactions, etc.) 
can be “wrapped” as a set of services as well (Ibid).
Web services use the latest technologies. They can reduce the risk that 
organizations end up using obsolete technologies and third party utilities; they 
also reduce the reliance on external application providers to offer the latest 
technologies (Ratnasingam, 2004).
It is claimed that Web service implementations can reduce IT investments. 
Some of the loosely-coupled services are maintained by outside providers and are 
not the responsibility of the company using them. This reduces the cost in 
employing experts in Web services. Since Web services use the same data and 
connection protocols, this enables communications with other applications 
without costly gateways and interfaces (Ibid).
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One of the key reasons why there is such interest in Web services is that 
they are well suited to enabling a Service-Oriented Architecture (SOA). The 
building of a SOA using Web services entails the solutions consisting of 
collections of autonomous services, identified by Uniform Resource Locators 
(URLs), with interfaces documented using WSDL, and processing well-defined 
XML messages. SOA is a natural complement to the Object-Oriented (OO), 
procedural and data-centric approaches to solution implementation. Service-
orientation simply assumes that the services execute autonomously and there is no 
requirement for local execution or common operating environment. Therefore, a 
SOA explicitly assumes that communication, availability, and type errors are 
common. Service-oriented designs explicitly rely on a variety of technologies to 
deal with asynchrony and partial failure modes to maintain system integrity. 
Techniques such as asynchronous messaging, transactions, reliable messaging, 
and redundant deployment are the norm in a service-oriented systems. Service-
orientation assumes, unlike the in-memory model, that not only that an incoming 
message may be malformed, but that it may have been transmitted for malicious 
or completely unexpected purposes. Consequently service-oriented systems 
protect themselves by placing the burden of proof on all message senders by 
requiring applications to prove that the required rights have been granted to the 
sender. Consistent with the notion of service autonomy, service-oriented 
architectures typically rely on administratively managed trust relationships to 
avoid per-service authentication mechanisms common in classic web applications 
(Ferguson et al., 2003)
Everything that is Web-based is subject to certain threats. In the next 
section, some of these threats are discussed.
2.4 Web Services Threats
Web services provide rich functionality, etc., but are not risk free. 
Common methods and processes provided by standards can create opportunities 
for an attacker. Attacks increase drastically and the impact is felt more as 
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standards move further up in the Web service architecture. Therefore, it is 
important that security mechanisms are in place.  Web services are loosely-
coupled components by nature. This creates a flexible, plug-and-play architecture 
with replaceable sections which encourage scalability. The communication 
between these components provides new risks, because each component needs to 
be secure. Care should be taken that communicating components are authorized. 
Federation of sources can eliminate redundancy and add to the flexibility and 
scalability. This federation assumes much about the quality of the data and the 
inherent trust built into the environment. It is important that trust and integrity 
mechanisms are in place. Sources need to be authorized to establish trust 
(Lindstrom, 2004). However, trust is beyond the scope of this dissertation.
Web service messages need to be secure, because a message might travel 
through multiple intermediaries, where point-to-point security is then not 
possible. Common threats can be any of the following. Message alteration takes 
place where content of the message is changed by an unauthorized entity. 
Confidentiality can be jeopardized when an unauthorized entity gains access to 
data contained within a message. Man-in-the-middle attacks are when an 
intermediary is compromised and messages are intercepted. These message might 
be examined (confidentiality attack) or messages can be altered. Spoofing is a 
complex, but common attack which takes advantage of trust relationships. The 
malicious entity assumes the identity of a trusted entity and sabotage message. 
Denial of service (DoS) attacks focus on preventing authorized entities from using 
a particular service. DoS attacks take advantage of weaknesses in system 
architectures. Message security mechanisms add processing overhead and might 
result in a DoS attack when bombarded with messages that need security 
processing. Replay attacks occur when a message is recorded and re-submitted to 
a service (Booth et al., 2004).
The previous discussed threats can be countered if care is taken with 
implementing the Web service standards as described in Section 2.2. Security 
mechanisms are discussed in Chapter 5.
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2.5 Conclusion
In conclusion, a Web service can be defined as a Web application that is 
platform and language neutral. It can be accessed over the Web and provides from 
simple to very complex business processing. Therefore, Web services are the 
choice for creating a global, interoperable, collaboration space for messaging 
between business partners.
The Web service used for messaging – the “Message Handler” - within the 
proposed framework is the Vehicle depot. This depot will represent an 
International Protocol Agreement for messaging and security. The vehicle is a 
standardized SOAP message that will transport the cargo (business document) to 
the destination depot. WSDL is used to describe the depot so that other vehicles
can use it to deliver goods or request goods. UDDI advertise the depot. The cargo
will be XML business documents which must be standardized for interoperability. 
These standardized documents are beyond the scope of this dissertation.
Web services promise many benefits if properly implemented, but it does 
pose certain threats. Trust is a main issue since trading occurs in an uncertain 
virtual environment. Technology trust is based on technical safeguards, protective 
measures, and control mechanisms that aim to provide reliable transactions with 
timely, accurate and complete data transmission (Ratnasingam, 2004). Security 
specifications must be implemented to ensure this trust. These security measures 
counter the known threats to Web services.
The vehicles (soap messages) that transport business information need to 
know where to go (be destination-aware). In the next chapter, the focus is on the 
WS-Addressing standard which has been developed for interoperable message 
addressing. This will be used to equip the vehicle with the necessary capability to 
identify and reach its destination.
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Chapter 3
Routing the Vehicle
The messages exchanged between service requestors and service providers 
need to know how to reach their intended destinations. A common mechanism is 
needed for messages to be routed and addressed in the Web services multi-
destination world. This suggests providing a standard, interoperable addressing 
mechanism to all vehicles traveling between different depots.
Prior to Web services becoming more complex and requiring additional 
information for referencing a specific endpoint, the location of the Web service 
was manually requested. The transport layer protocol facilitates the addressing, 
but this information is not always accessible to the upper layer applications. Not 
all transport protocols are able to convey additional transport information in the 
case where it is needed to locate a specific endpoint or additional information 
needs to be passed to the endpoint for processing purposes (Davis, 2004).
Web service Addressing (WS-Addressing) has been introduced to cater for 
these needs. WS-Addressing defines two interoperable constructs which contain 
information that is typically provided by transport protocols and messaging 
systems. The question can be posed: Why is it necessary if this kind of 
information is provided by the transport protocol? The answer: To provide 
interoperability. The constructs normalize the underlying transport information 
into a uniform format that can be processed independently of transport or 
application. The two constructs are endpoint references and message addressing 
properties (Hadley & Gudgin, 2005).
A Web service endpoint is a reference-enabled entity, processor or 
resource, where Web service messages can be sent to. An endpoint reference 
contains the information needed to address a Web service endpoint (Ibid). 
Endpoint references are suitable for carrying the necessary information needed to 
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access a Web service endpoint. It can be used to provide addresses for individual 
messages sent to and from Web services (Box et al., 2004).
Message addressing properties carry uniform end-to-end message 
characteristics which are independent of underlying transport protocols, to 
provide the addresses for individual messages that are sent to and from Web 
services. These characteristics include addressing for source and destination 
endpoints and message identity (Hadley & Gudgin, 2005). This will be elaborated 
next.
3.1 Defining an Address
Since Web services are becoming more complex to support enterprise-
level solutions, it may be necessary to include additional information in a SOAP 
request that helps to uniquely identify a Web service instance. Identifiers can be 
appended to an URL, but this does not support interoperability, because not all 
systems are able to process such information and pass it to upper-layer 
applications. Therefore, it is better to add such information as additional SOAP 
headers. Adding such information into the SOAP message enables the message to 
be transport independent (Davis, 2004).
The WS-Addressing specification defines an Endpoint reference, which is 
a new description element type, with the intent of supporting a set of dynamic 
usage patterns. Essentially, an Endpoint reference is just an URL wrapped by 
some XML elements. WS-Addressing supports the dynamic generation and 
customization of service endpoint descriptions, the identification and description 
of specific service instances that are created as a result of stateless interactions 
and flexible and dynamic exchange of endpoint information in tightly coupled 
environments where communicating parties share a set of common assumptions 
about specific policies or protocols that are used during the interaction. The 
Endpoint referencing logically extends the WSDL description model, but does not 
replace it (Hadley & Gudgin, 2005).
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Endpoint referencing is used when specific instances of a stateful service 
need to be identified or if instance-specific configuration details need to be 
transmitted. It is also used for when additional information, such as policy 
information, needs to be added or updated, as a result of dynamic configuration 
processes (Box et al., 2004).
Using an Endpoint reference will provide the vehicle with an interoperable 
addressing mechanism in which, besides address information, additional 
identification can be specified to identify a vehicle depot. Figure 5 illustrates an 
Endpoint reference.
<wsa:EndpointReference xmlns:wsa="..." xmlns:fabrikm="...">     
<wsa:Address>http://www.fabrikam123.example/acct</wsa:Address>
     <wsa:ReferenceProperties>
          <fabrikam:CustomerKey>123456789</fabrikam:CustomerKey>
    </wsa:ReferenceProperties>
    <wsa:ReferenceParameters>
        <fabrikam:ShoppingCart>ABCDEFG</fabrikam:ShoppingCart>
    </wsa:ReferenceParameters>
</wsa:EndpointReference>
Figure 5: An example of an endpoint reference
An <EndpointReference> element consists of a mandatory <Address> 
element. This is an URI address that identifies the endpoint (Hadley & Gudgin, 
2005). This address will identify the depot.
An optional <ReferenceParameters> element conveys the reference 
parameters. These parameters specify additional information needed to interact 
with an endpoint (Ibid).  A vehicle will be able to identify a depot, using the 
<Address> element, but the <ReferenceParameter> element can provide 
additional information, such as a session identifier.
Another optional element, <MetaData>, stipulates metadata information 
needed to interact with an endpoint. An example can be a pointer to the location 
of a WSDL document (Ibid).
The vehicle transporting the cargo needs address information so that it 
knows where to deliver the cargo it conveys. It provides the depot with address 
information so that the depot knows where requested goods or error reports need 
to be delivered.
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3.2 Providing Addresses
The WS-Addressing specification defines Message Addressing Properties
to identify and locate endpoints involved in an interaction. The basic interaction 
pattern is one way. This type of pattern defines a source sending a message to a 
destination without any further definition of the interaction. This will be like a 
vehicle only delivering goods at a depot. Request-reply is a common interaction 
pattern that consists of an initial message sent by a source endpoint (the request) 
and a subsequent message sent from the destination of the request back to the 
source (the reply). A reply can be an application message, a fault, or any other 
message. In this interaction pattern the vehicle will deliver goods and expects a 
response back on the delivered goods (Hadley & Gudgin, 2005).
Message Addressing Properties blocks provide the end-to-end 
characteristics of a message which can be easily secured as a unit. The 
information in these blocks is unchangeable and is not supposed to be modified 
along the path (Box et al., 2004).  Figure 6 illustrates the Message Addressing 
properties.
<wsa:MessageID>xs:anyURI</wsa:MessageID>
<wsa:RelatesTo RelationshipType="...">xs:anyURI</wsa:RelatesTo>
<wsa:To>xs:anyURI</wsa:To>
<wsa:Action>xs:anyURI</wsa:Action>
<wsa:From>endpoint-reference</wsa:From>
<wsa:ReplyTo>endpoint-reference</wsa:ReplyTo>
<wsa:FaultTo>endpoint-reference</wsa:FaultTo>
Figure 6: An example message addressing properties
The optional <MessageID> element contains a value of type anyURI. This 
value uniquely identifies the specific message. There may only be one of this 
element present in a message. When the <ReplyTo> or <FaultTo> elements are 
present in a messege, then <MessageID> element must be present. This will 
identify the message to associate it with a reply on a request or a generated fault. 
No two messages should have the same message ID (Hadley & Gudgin, 2005). 
The <MessageID> element can be seen as a vehicle registration plate. This 
uniquely identifies the vehicle and no two vehicles are allowed to have the same 
registration plates.
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The optional <RelatesTo> element specifies a relationship with another 
message. A reply message must contain a <RelatesTo> element. The value is a 
message ID. This element is critical in an asynchronous messaging scenario, since 
the receiver of the response message must be able to associate it with the original 
request message (Ibid). This element will indicate the registration number of the 
vehicle who delivered the processed goods.
The optional <ReplyTo> element provides an Endpoint reference to which 
all replies needs to be addressed for this specific message. There may only be one 
occurrence of this element and must be accompanied by the <MessageID> 
element (Ibid). This element will provide a depot with a destination depot address 
to which vehicles must be sent to deliver goods in response to the received goods.
The optional <From> element indicates the source endpoint where the 
message originates from. There may only be one occurrence of this element in a 
message. When the <ReplyTo> element is missing, then the value of this element 
will be used to route responses to (Ibid). This element points to the vehicle depot 
from which goods are received.
The optional element <FaultTo> specifies an Endpoint reference which 
will process faults related to this message. Should this element be present, the 
<MessageID> element must also be present.  If no <FaultTo> is specified, then 
the value of the <ReplyTo> element is used, otherwise the value of the <From> 
element (Ibid). This element specifies the vehicle depot that will process fault 
reports about a specific vehicle.
The required <To> element points to the intended receiver of the message. 
This value is of type anyURI (Ibid). This element indicates the destined vehicle 
depot where goods need to be delivered.
The required <Action> element, of type anyURI, conveys an identifier that 
uniquely and opaquely identifies the semantics implied by a message. The value 
of this element is an URI identifying an input, output or fault message within a 
WSDL port type (Ibid). This element will indicate to the receiving vehicle depot 
the process that must act on the delivered goods.
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These Message Addressing properties are useful in specifying interaction 
patterns. This allows for load balancing over different Web services. However, 
certain faults can occur, as discussed in the next sub-section.
3.3 Addressing Faults
A fault message is generated if proper processing of a message cannot
occur. A fault message will be sent to the endpoint specified in the <FaultTo> 
element. If this element is absent, the value of <ReplyTo>, otherwise the value 
contained in the <From> element, must be used. Fault messages are linked as 
replies using the value of the <RelatesTo> element (Box et al., 2004). Faults will 
occur when a vehicle depot cannot accommodate a vehicle. Defined faults can be 
any of the following (Ibid):
 Invalid Message Addressing Properties - this fault occurs when 
Message Addressing Properties cannot be processed;
 Message Addressing Properties Required - this fault occurs 
when a required Message Addressing Property is absent; 
 Destination Unreachable - this fault occurs when the specified 
destination endpoint cannot be found to process message;
 Action Not Supported - this fault occurs when the specified 
Action in the message is not supported at the destined endpoint;
 Endpoint Unavailable - this fault occurs when the endpoint is 
unable to process the message either due to some temporary issue 
or a permanent failure.
These fault messages must be processed by the endpoint receiving the 
fault messages. The fault must be rectified before retransmitting the message.
Security is the main emphasis of this dissertation. In the next section, the 
focus will be on areas where security is needed.
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3.4 Security Consideration
In this section, the information is based on Box et al, 2004, unless 
otherwise stated.
It is strongly recommended that the communication between services is
secured using the mechanisms described in the WS-Security specification.
The body and some (relevant) headers need to be included in the digital 
signature to guarantee proper secure messages. Using digital signatures can 
prevent spoofing by any intermediaries.  This ensures that the vehicle depot can 
trust the vehicle and be assured of its identity.
Addressing headers not digitally signed, might be the result of a header 
insertion which leads to a redirect attack.  Digitally signed headers indicate to the 
vehicle depot that the headers are included by the original owner of the vehicle.
In some cases, it is important that the vehicle information be disclosed to 
ensure end-to-end privacy. If the vehicle is intercepted, then the addressing 
information must not be available. However, it is important that the <To> element 
be in the open for intermediary processing.
It is recommended that the <MessageID> element be accompanied by a 
timestamp to guarantee a proper unique identifier. This is especially helpful in the 
detection of replay messages.
Common classes of attacks include message alteration, message 
disclosure, address spoofing, key integrity, authentication, accountability, 
availability and replay. To prevent these attacks, measures such as WS-
Encryption and WS-Signatures are used. These measures are discussed in Chapter 
5 (which discusses how to secure the vehicle).
3.5 Conclusion
The main reason for using WS-Addressing is that it standardizes the way 
locations of a Web service (or instance of a Web service) are specified, by using 
two interoperable constructs namely Endpoint Reference and Message Addressing 
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Properties. It enhances message flow, processing and server scalability. This 
contributes towards the ultimate goal of “global” interoperability. This has a deep 
impact on SOAP engines and the future of the SOAP protocol itself (Davis, 
2004).
An Endpoint reference conveys information needed to access a Web 
service endpoint, e.g. session identifiers, additional parameters, etc. Endpoint 
references provide addresses for individual messages. 
Message Addressing Properties contains the uniform addresses for 
individual messages sent from a Web Service. The headers convey end-to-end 
message characteristics such as source and destination endpoints.
In most services, WSDL describes a very simple request/response 
synchronous message pattern. However, with the use of WS-Addressing, any 
Web service, whether it was explicitly defined as asynchronous or not, will 
implicitly have asynchronous support simply through the correct use of WS-
Addressing headers. This is a very powerful tool now available to SOAP 
applications. The WS-Transaction (WS-Coordination and WS-
AtomicTransaction) specification defines two different port types for 
asynchronous and synchronous message patterns, but with WS-Addressing, this 
specification now becomes obsolete (Davis, 2004).
In our analogy, the vehicle is now equipped with addressing information 
and should be able to be routed to its destination. It is important that the vehicle 
be reliable in transporting critical business information. In the next chapter,
reliable messaging is covered.
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Chapter 4
Reliable Transportation
Enterprise message exchange consists of business information such as 
purchase orders, contracts and requests for quotes. These types of messages are 
often critical in nature and the business must be assured of the reliability of the 
underlying message architecture (Snell, 2001).
The Internet by its very nature is unreliable (Ibid). Many errors can 
interrupt a message exchange between systems: messages may be lost, duplicated 
or reordered. Further, the host systems may experience failures and lose volatile 
state. These failures can be software component, system or network failures 
(Ferris et al. 2005).
The HTTP protocol is a nice, lightweight mechanism to send almost any 
type of data format. However, it has the problem that it does not guarantee 
delivery. It might have a reliability of 92% to 96%, but if 99.9% reliability is 
required, or at least a notification of message delivery, then HTTP is not 
necessarily the protocol of choice (Brandel, 2004).
Using SOAP over HTTP is not sufficient when an application-level 
messaging protocol must also guarantee some level of reliability and security. The 
WS-Reliability specification describes a reliable protocol which ensures reliable 
messaging (Iwasa, Durand, Rutt, Peel, Kunisetty & Bunting, 2004).
Another possible approach to ensuring reliable messaging is to employ a 
reliable transport protocol, such as a Message Queuing (MQ) service, rather than 
using HTTP to transmit SOAP messages. A very popular MQ service is IBM 
Websphere MQ, which acts as a mediator to guaranteed delivery by storing 
messages locally until it receives a delivery acknowledgement. Web services are 
completely independent of the underlying protocol and it is possible to send a 
message over SMTP, File Transfer Protocol (FTP) or a MQ system. Two major 
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problems surface when using a MQ System. Firstly, MQ systems are proprietary 
and do not necessarily interoperate with other proprietary MQ systems, which 
leads to interoperability issues. Secondly, MQ systems are expensive to 
implement (Brandel, 2004).
The reliable delivery of messages is seen as crucial for Web services to 
become the primary infrastructure for heterogeneous interconnection of business 
processes, systems and products. It is not possible to solve many business 
problems if the participants cannot be sure of the completion of message 
exchanges (Box et al., 2003). It is important that a vehicle gets to a vehicle depot 
to deliver goods. Snell (2001) gives the simple definition of reliable messaging as 
follows: “Reliable Messaging is making sure that both the sender and recipient of 
a message both know whether or not a message was actually sent and received,
and furthermore making sure that the message was sent once and only once to the 
intended recipient”.
Reliable messaging, as proposed by the WS-ReliableMessaging (Ferris et 
al., 2005) and WS-Reliability (Iwasa et al., 2004) specifications, is achieved by a 
defined message protocol that identifies, tracks and manages the reliable delivery 
of messages between exactly two parties (a source and a destination). A SOAP 
binding is defined that promotes interoperability.
The following sections will focus on the Reliable Messaging 
specifications.
4.1 Reliability Features
The Reliable messaging specifications define four reliability features.  The 
first, AtMostOnce, ensures that no duplication of messages occurs or an error will 
be raised. It might happen that not all messages will be delivered. The second, 
AtLeastOnce, specifies that all messages sent will be delivered or an error will be 
raised. This guarantees delivery. The third, the ExactlyOnce, is a combination of
the AtMostOnce and AtLeastOnce features. This semantic ensures that every 
message sent will be delivered without any duplication or an error will be raised. 
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The fourth, the InOrder semantic, ensures that messages will be delivered in the 
order that they were sent. This feature can be combined with any of the previous 
three (Iwasa et al., 2004; Ferris et al., 2005).
Figure 7 illustrates the entities and events in a simple reliable message 
exchange. The process is as follows.
 The Application Source sends a message for reliable delivery;
 The Reliable Messaging (RM) source accepts the message and 
Transmits it one or more times;
 After receiving the message, the RM Destination acknowledges it;
 Finally, the RM Destination delivers the message to the 
Application Destination.
Figure 7: Reliable Messaging model (Iwasa et al., 2004)
4.2 Establishing Reliable Transportation
To establish reliable messaging between vehicle depots, certain SOAP 
elements are included within the SOAP headers of messages traveling between 
the depots. These elements can be the <Request>, <PollRequest> and 
<Response> element. In this section, the information is based on Iwasa et al., 
2004, unless otherwise stated.
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The <Request> element carries information pertaining to the Reliable 
Message. This element contains the following elements: MessageId, ExpiryTime, 
ReplyPattern, AckRequested, DuplicateElimination and the MessageOrder 
element.
The <MessageID> element has a GroupID attribute that uniquely 
identifies a group of messages. The child element, <SequenceNum> is included 
for all groups containing more than one message. The sequence number is used 
for message ordering. This child element contains a groupExpiryTime or 
groupMaxIdleDuration, number and a last attribute. This element uniquely 
identifies the vehicle and number the order of the vehicles if more than one 
delivery must take place.
Sequences are the key to reliable messaging, because they are used to 
uniquely identify messages, find duplicates and create a reliability context for 
message acknowledgments (Windley, 2004). 
The value contained within the <ExpiryTime> element indicates the date 
and time after which a message must not be processed. If the vehicle reaches the 
depot after the specified time, then the vehicle must be rejected by the vehicle 
depot.
The <ReplyPattern> element contains two elements, namely <Value> and 
<ReplyTo>. This element specifies whether the receiving entity of the reliable 
message should send the acknowledgment indication or fault indication back in 
the response to the reliable message, in a separate callback request, or in the
response to a separate poll request. If the <Value> element contains the value of 
“Callback”, then only the <ReplyTo> element must be included specifying the 
reply information.
In case where the guaranteed delivery feature is used, then the 
<AckRequestd> element must be present. This requires the recipient to send an 
acknowledgement or a fault message. When the receiving vehicle depot receives 
an <AckRequested> element, then it must respond with a message indicating that 
a vehicle was accepted or it must indicate if there were any faults.
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The <DuplicateMessage> and <MessageOrder> elements must be present 
when the no duplicate message and message ordering features are used.
A message containing a <PollRequest> element, requests a reply 
acknowledging the deliverance or failure of reliable messages. It contains the 
<ReplyTo> and <RefToMessageIDs> elements. The <ReplyTo> specifies the 
endpoint to which response messages must be sent. The <RefToMessageIDs> 
element contains the identifiers of groups and messages whose status are 
requested. The <SequenceNumRange> specifies the sequence numbers of the 
requested messages. The GroupID attribute specifies the group IDs for the 
messages. When a <Pollrequest> message is sent to a vehicle depot, then that 
depot must respond to the request indicating the status of the messages specified 
in the sequence number range.
The <Response> element indicates the acknowledgements or faults of 
reliable messages. It must contains the <NonSequenceReply> and/or 
<SequenceReplies> elements. The <NonSequenceReply> is used for messages 
not containing a sequence number.  The groupid attribute specifies the group 
identifier for a message and the fault attribute indicates a reliable messaging fault 
encountered while processing the message. A reply message on a group of 
messages with sequence numbers must contain the <SequenceReplies> element. 
This element contains a groupId attribute and one or more <ReplyRange> 
elements. The ReplyRange element indicates a range of sequence numbers with a 
shared delivery status. The fault attribute specifies a fault encountered for one 
specific message or a range. The <Response> element is included in a message 
which a vehicle depot sends in response on a acknowledgement or Poll message. 
This message will indicate the acceptance of vehicles delivering goods.
It was mentioned earlier that fault messages must be sent in certain 
scenarios. The WS-Reliability specification defines two sets of fault messages.  
The message format fault set covers malformed reliable messages and the 
message processing fault set covers all faults generated while processing the 
message. The focus will be on these fault messages in the next section.
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4.3 Faults in a Reliable Transportation
The receiving vehicle depot returns these protocol specific fault codes 
within the Response header element. Reliable message faults are carried in the 
SOAP Header and do not rely exclusively on the SOAP Fault model. 
Message format faults can be any of the following: InvalidRequest, 
InvalidPollRequest, InvalidMessageId, InvalidMessageParameters, 
InvalidReplyPattern and InvalidExpiryTime. These fault messages are generated 
when there is a problem with the message format.
Message processing faults consist of the following: FeatureNotSupported, 
PermanentProcessingFailure, MessageProcessingFailure and GroupAborted. 
Processing faults occur when the received message cannot be processed.
The sending vehicle depot must be able to process these fault messages 
and correct the problem before retransmitting the messages. At the receiving side, 
the Reliable messaging component is not allowed to deliver the message when a 
fault occurs. It must send a fault message to the service sending the messages 
(Iwasa et al., 2004).
The same as with all other messages, it is important that the reliable 
messages are secured. The next section will focus on certain security 
considerations.
4.4 Security Considerations
It is strongly recommended that the mechanisms described in WS-Security 
are used to ensure secure communication. The body and headers must be included 
in the digital signature to bind them together. This will prevent an intermediary 
from making unauthorized changes to the reliable messaging headers (Ferris et 
al., 2005).
There is a core tension between security and reliable messaging that can 
be problematic if not considered in implementations. The core functionality of 
reliable messaging is to replay messages until they are acknowledged, whereas 
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security prevents message replay. Care should be taken to prevent competition
between these two mechanisms (Ibid).
Attacks that are associated with the reliable messaging include message 
alteration, message disclosure, key integrity, authentication, accountability and 
availability. Security measures to prevent these types of attacks are discussed in 
Chapter 5.
4.5 Conclusion
The reliable delivery of messages is crucial if Web services are to become 
part of the mission-critical infrastructure that integrates applications inside and 
outside of the enterprise. Should Web services not support reliable messaging, it 
is the onus of high-level applications to ensure message delivery and to prevent 
message duplications. This is an impractical solution, since application-level 
solutions make it difficult and costly to extend services to other trading partners 
(Windley, 2004).
This research proposes a framework for a global message handler service, 
which will act as an endpoint manager, creating and managing sequences with the 
necessary security elements added to messages. End-to-end reliable messaging 
dramatically reduces the error conditions that an application developer contends 
with. A reliable messaging system manages this complexity for developers in a 
uniform way (Cohen, Geller, Kaler, Langworthy, & Limprecht, 2004).
It is believed that the WS-Reliability specification will provide a standard 
protocol for reliable messaging while ensuring interoperability. Similarly to other 
Web service specifications, this specification acts as a building block to a more 
sophisticated system. This specification integrates with and compliments WS-
Security, WS-Policy and other Web service specifications. These together ensure 
a secure reliable messaging environment across service boundaries (Ferris et al., 
2005).
At this point, a reliable and routable vehicle can be configured that carries 
information to specified vehicle depots. One crucial aspect, security, which has 
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been alluded to a number of times, still needs to be addressed. A vehicle needs to 
be safe, have positive identification, be able to be authenticated and be allowed 
access to certain areas. All details of departure, arrival, cargo, etc, need to be 
traceable. In the next chapter, the focus will be on security implementations to 
facilitate these required needs.
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Chapter 5
Securing the Vehicle
Web Services is about increasing access functionality through using a 
SOA to: publish, find and bind. However, information security techniques and 
measures are necessary to secure and restrict access to information. Information 
on the Internet can be either in storage or in transit. There are always security 
risks, as messages could be stolen, lost, or modified while in transit over the 
Internet (Nakamur, Hada, & Neyama, 2002). It is important that when the 
information is in transit that it arrives intact at its destination and that the recipient
knows who has sent it. This involves making the data and the transfer process 
secure. Web Services security is about making a process secure. Web Services 
security involves using different security technologies for each security aspect. 
These will be discussed in this chapter (O’Neill et al., 2003).
The vehicle that transports the information, in the proposed model, needs
to be secured. In this chapter, the focus is on the WS-Security specification
ensuring secure Web services.
5.1 Building Blocks of Security
Information security is divided into logical components which are: 
confidentiality, authorization, integrity, non-repudiation and availability. These 
building blocks for a secure environment will be discussed next.
5.1.1 Confidentiality
Confidentiality refers to the requirement that data is not available to a third 
party when sent between two entities. Confidentiality ensures that information 
carried by the vehicle is not accessible in any way to a third party who is not 
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allowed to access the data. Therefore, the information carried by the vehicle is 
secret and should only be disclosed to the intended recipient of the data.
Confidentiality can be achieved by implementing encryption. An 
encryption algorithm is used to change plain-text to cipher-text. The algorithm 
uses a key variable to encrypt data, which is only known by the parties who are 
exchanging the confidential data.
There are two types of encryption generally used with Web services 
security: symmetric and asymmetric encryption. Encryption also forms the basis 
for digital signatures.
Symmetric encryption involves the same key for encryption and 
decryption. This means that the receiving vehicle depot will use the same known 
secret to decrypt the data which has been encrypted by the sending vehicle depot 
using the same secret. Symmetric algorithms include Data Encryption Standard 
(DES) and Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). The shared secret can be 
communicated using a separate communication channel (e.g. phone), which is 
feasible for infrequent communication, but not possible within a SOA. The 
second option is to encrypt the secret key for physical distribution. The most 
feasible method is using asymmetric encryption.
Asymmetric encryption involves the use of two different keys for 
encryption and decryption. The most famous and widely used algorithm is RSA 
(named after its creators, Rivest, Shamir and Adleman). The decryption key is not 
sent to the recipient of the encrypted data. The sender and the receiver will both 
have a pair consisting of a private and public key. The sender will encrypt the data 
using the public key of the receiver. The receiver will decrypt the data using its 
own private key.
Symmetric encryption is faster than asymmetric encryption. Therefore, 
symmetric encryption is used to encrypt the data and asymmetric only to encrypt 
the secret key (O’Neill et al., 2003).
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5.1.2 Integrity
Integrity implies the detection of tampered data in information security. It 
does not imply that information cannot be tampered with. Implementing integrity 
measures ensures that a vehicle depot can determine whether transported data has 
been altered. Hashing algorithms are used to generate a digest of the data. The 
digest is bound to the original data. If the original data changes slightly and the 
hashing algorithm is executed again, the digest will be different. An example of a 
hashing algorithm is SHA-1.
A hashing algorithm alone cannot ensure integrity, because an attacker can 
tamper with a message, generate a new digest and replace the original digest. 
Asymmetric encryption plays an important role in integrity. The digest needs to 
be encrypted with the private key of the sender. It can only be decrypted using the 
corresponding public key, ensuring that it is sent by the sender. The encrypted 
digest is called a digital signature (O’Neill et al., 2003).
5.1.3 Non-Repudiation
Non-repudiation means that a sender of a message cannot claim to not 
have sent a given message. A vehicle depot cannot deny the transportation of data 
sent to another vehicle depot. A public key needs to be connected to the identity 
of an entity that is digitally signing the data or decrypting data. This binding to an 
identity delivers non-repudiation.
Non-repudiation relies on digital certificates. Digital certificates typically 
includes identity information about the entity holding the corresponding private 
key, a serial number and expiry date and the public key itself. The X.509 
specification is used to format the information in a digital certificate (O’Neill et 
al., 2003).
Non-repudiation is very important in a communication environment; 
neither the sender nor the receiver can deny the sending or receiving of a 
message, respectively.
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5.1.4 Authentication
Authentication is the establishing of the identification of an entity. In the 
vehicle analogy, this will constitute the identification of a vehicle (SOAP 
message) and a vehicle depot (source Message Handler). The vehicle must 
identify the identity of the vehicle depot and vice versa. This will ensure that the 
vehicle delivers goods to the correct depot and that the vehicle depot will only 
allow authenticated vehicles to deliver goods.
Digital certificates can be used to identify and authenticate an entity. Other 
methods are available for authentication, such as biometrics, passwords and 
hardware devices that issue one-time passwords. These have in common a token 
that is in the possession of the entity that is being authenticated. In a Web service 
environment, Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) defines an XML 
syntax used for exchanging information about authentication and authorization
(O’Neill et al., 2003).
5.1.5 Authorization
Authorization is sometimes linked with authentication. It is important to 
distinguish between the two. Authentication is about whom an entity is and 
authorization is about what the entity is allowed to do. It is not necessarily the 
case that when a user is authenticated that the user is authorized. However, 
authentication is necessary for authorization. SAML provides a means for 
authorization to be conveyed to related Web services in a single-sign-on fashion
(O’Neill et al., 2003).
A vehicle needs to be authenticated before it can be authorized to deliver 
or collect goods from a vehicle depot. The vehicle depot needs to know who the 
vehicle is to determine to which resources the vehicle may have access.
5.1.6 Availability
Availability is not always an obvious requirement for security, but it can 
be costly for a business should critical information not be available during 
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common usage. Vehicle depots need to be available for vehicles to deliver or 
collect goods. Security services themselves require to be available.
Denial of Service (DoS) attacks deny availability. This is achieved by 
exhausting the resource of a service and making it unavailable to legitimate users.
All of the above security requirements need to be met when developing a 
secure Web service. Web services security presents three challenges (O’Neill et 
al., 2003):
 The challenge of security based on the end user of a Web service;
 The challenge of maintaining security while routing between 
multiple Web services;
 The challenge of abstracting security from the underlying network.
These three challenges have one common solution and that is to persist 
security data in the SOAP message itself. This will lead to the situation that the 
security data is not lost after one SOAP communication is ended.
WS-Security has emerged as the de facto standard for including security 
data in the SOAP message. WS-Security defines placeholders in the SOAP header 
in order to insert security data. It defines how to add encryption and digital 
signatures to SOAP messages and a general mechanism for inserting arbitrary 
security tokens.
5.2 Adding Security to the Vehicle
 Information that is carried by the vehicles between vehicle depots needs 
to be secure. OASIS had drawn up a specification called the Web Service 
Security: SOAP Message Security 1.0 to cater for these security needs within a 
SOAP message (Nadalin, Kaler, Hallam-Baker, & Monzillo, 2004). The focus in 
this section will be on this specific standard unless otherwise specified.
WS-Security describes enhancements to SOAP messages to provide the 
building blocks of security which ensures quality of protection through message 
integrity, message confidentiality, and single message authentication (security 
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tokens). These mechanisms allow the use of a wide variety of security models and 
encryption technologies. The vehicle can be equipped with standardized security 
measures to meet security needs.
It must be remembered that WS-Security by itself does not ensure security 
and does not ensure a complete security solution. It needs to be implemented with 
higher-level application-specific protocols to ensure a more secure solution. The 
goal of WS-Security is to generate secure SOAP message communication.
The question that might be posed is why is WS-Security necessary if VPN 
protocols are available? The VPN protocols secure the message and authenticate 
the sender, but once a message is received, it is no longer protected by the VPN 
protocol. This is the reason why WS-Security is important. It also promotes 
interoperability. Different threats can jeopardize a SOAP message.
5.2.1 Threats to the Vehicle
The main threats to a SOAP message include, firstly, the modification of 
the message; or, the message can be read by adversaries; or, an adversary can 
send messages to a service that, while well-formed, lack appropriate security 
claims to guarantee processing. There are more threats than mentioned above.
Security token assertions can be used to counter these threats. Security 
tokens assert claims, and signatures provide a mechanism for proving knowledge 
of the key by the sender. The signature is used to bind or associate with the 
claims in the security token (assuming that the token is trusted). It must be 
considered that such binding is limited to those elements covered by the signature.
A claim can be either endorsed, or not, by a trusted authority. An endorsed 
claim is usually represented as a signed security token that is digitally signed or 
encrypted by the trusted authority. An X.509 certificate, claiming the binding 
between the identity and public key, is an example of a signed security token.
Primary security concerns are that the vehicle must be protected from 
interception (confidentiality) or unauthorized modification (integrity). The WS-
Security specification provides a means of protection by encrypting and/or 
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digitally signing a body, a header, an attachment, or any combination or parts of 
them.
Message integrity is provided by using XML Signature in union with 
security tokens ensuring that the messages are transmitted without unauthorized 
modifications. The integrity mechanisms are designed to support multiple 
signatures, potentially by multiple actors and are extensible to support additional 
signature formats.
Message confidentiality employs XML Encryption in conjunction with 
security tokens to keep portions of a SOAP message confidential. The encryption 
mechanisms are designed to support additional encryption processes and 
operators by multiple actors.
WS-Security primarily uses XML Encryption and XML Signatures to 
implement security measures in a SOAP message (vehicle). The next section 
focuses on how to implement these standards in the vehicle to ensure 
confidentiality, integrity, etc.
5.3 Fitting the Security System
5.3.1 Identifying Components
The WS-Security specification defines the ID attribute so that recipients 
need not understand the full schema of the message for the processing of the 
security elements.  The reason for using an ID attribute is to reference other 
message elements, such as signature references or correlating signature security 
tokens. The ID helps to locate components of the vehicle that are involved with 
the security system.
It is recommended that an ID reference is used when signing a part of an 
envelope, such as the body, instead of a more general transformation, especially 
XPath. This is primarily to simplify processing. This element identifier attribute 
can be applied to any element that either allows arbitrary attributes or specifically 
allows a particular attribute.
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Two ID attributes within an XML document must not have the same 
value. Implementations can rely on schema validation to provide uniqueness 
within the document, but it is recommended that applications should not rely on 
schema validation alone to enforce uniqueness.
5.3.2 Security System Container
The <Security> element identifies the header block, which is placed 
within the SOAP-header of a message, which conveys security related message 
information to a receiver. The <Security> element can be seen as a container that 
contains all the security related information regarding the secure vehicle 
components. Multiple <Security> elements may be present in a message if they 
are aimed at different recipients.
Elements which are added to the <Security> header block should be 
placed in front of the existing security elements. As such, the <Security> header 
block represents the signing and encryption steps the message sender took to 
create the message. This pre-pending rule ensures that the receiver application can 
process sub-elements in the order they appear in the <Security> header block, 
because there will be no forward dependency among the sub-elements.
Figure 8 illustrates the syntax for using the <Security> element.
<s:Envelope>
  <s:Header>
….
    <Security S:Actor=”…” S:MustUnderstand=”…”>
…
    </Security>
  </s:Header>
</s:Envelope>
Figure 8: Syntax of the Security element
Within the <Security> element different Security tokens can be specified. 
The Username token can be added using the <UsernameToken> element. This 
token conveys basic authentication information such as the claimed identity. The 
<Username> element is a required sub-element and specifies the username of the 
authenticating party. Figure 9 illustrates the use of the Username Token.
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<UsernameToken Id="...">
   <Username>...</Username>
   <Password Type="...">...</Password>
</UsernameToken>
Figure 9: Syntax of the UsernameToken element
Binary (e.g. X.509 certificates and Kerberos tickets) or other non-XML 
formatted tokens require a special encoding format which needs to be included 
within the <Security> header block. The <BinarySecurityToken> element is used 
to define a security token that is binary encoded. The ValueType attribute is used 
to indicate what kind of security token is used, such as a Kerberos ticket. The 
EncodingType attribute defines how the security token is encoded, e.g. 
base64Binary. Figure 10 illustrates the use of the <BinarySecurityToken> 
element.
<wsse:BinarySecurityToken
     xmlns:wsse="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2002/04/secext"
     Id="myToken"
     ValueType="wsse:X509v3"
     EncodingType="wsse:Base64Binary">
     MIIEZzCCA9CgAwIBAgIQEmtJZc0...
</wsse:BinarySecurityToken>
Figure 10: Syntax of the BinarySecurityToken element
When a security token is used within a SOAP message, it needs to be 
referenced by the elements using the token. Therefore, the 
<SecurityTokenReference> element provides an extensible mechanism for 
referencing security tokens. A security token is a set of claims. These claims can 
reside elsewhere and need to be retrieved by the receiving application.
All implementations must be able to process a <SecurityTokenReference> 
element. The <SecurityTokenReference> element can be used as a direct child 
element of <KeyInfo> to indicate the retrieval of the key information from a 
security token placed elsewhere. It is especially recommended that when XML 
Signature and XML Encryption is used, that a <SecurityTokenReference> 
element is placed inside a <KeyInfo> to reference the security token used for the 
signature or encryption.
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The primary goal of a reference is to uniquely identify the desired token. 
The following list provides a list of the specific reference mechanisms defined in 
preferred order from most to least specific:
 Direct Reference - this allows references to be included in tokens 
using URI fragments and external tokens using full URIs;
 Key Identifiers - this allows tokens to be referenced using an 
opaque value that represents the token;
 Key Names - this allows tokens to be referenced using a string that 
matches an identity assertion within the security token. This is a 
subset match and can result in multiple security tokens that match 
the specified name;
 Embedded References - this allows a token to be embedded as 
opposed to a pointer to a token that resides somewhere else.
Tokens are used for identifying and authenticating the vehicle. The focus 
will now move to digital signatures, used for ensuring integrity of goods in transit.
5.3.3 Proof Ownership and Goods Integrity
Digital signatures can be used to verify that a message has not been altered 
in transit and that the message was sent by the possessor of a particular security 
token.  This will provide proof that a vehicle is sent by a specific entity and that 
the goods are in the same condition as when sent.
The use of an XML Signature in conjunction with the 
<SecurityTokenReference> element implies the security token of a message 
signer may be correlated and a mapping made between the claims of the security 
token and the message as evaluated by the application.
XML Signatures are applicable to any digital content and XML. It is a 
method of associating a key with referenced data (Eastlake, Reagle, & Solo, 
2002). A signature can verify both the integrity of a message and the sender of the 
message. It provides a form of authentication, because only the corresponding key 
can decrypt encrypted information.
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Only one message digest algorithm is defined within the XML-Signature 
specification, namely SHA-1 (Secure Hash Algorithm -1). It is expected that 
additional and stronger algorithms will be developed with AES (Advanced 
Encryption Standard). The HMAC (Hashed Message Authentication Code) 
algorithm is recommended for message authentication. MACs and signature 
algorithms are syntactically identical but a MAC implies a shared secret key. A 
signature implies public key cryptography.
An implementation is required to use DSA (Digital Signature Algorithm) 
with SHA-1 signature algorithm, but it is recommended to use RSA with SHA-1 
algorithm. Two Canonicalization algorithms are specified in the XML Signature 
specification: The required Canonical XML (which omits comments) for 
implementation and the recommended Canonical XML with comments (Eastlake 
et al., 2002). The WS-Security specification recommends the Exclusive XML 
Canonicalization algorithm, because it addresses the pitfalls of general 
canonicalization that can occur from leaky namespaces (Nadalin et al., 2004).
The XML Signature and Encryption specifications allow any algorithm to 
be used; there are certain algorithms required or recommended for specific 
actions. In certain cases where a specific algorithm is specified to be used, it is not 
restricted to that algorithm. The permutations of implementations can be 
enormous with allowing all these different algorithms. Different implementations 
have difficulty in communicating with each other and interoperability will be 
difficult to achieve. 
Data to be signed must first be canonicalized before signing can take 
place. 
Using XML Signatures will ensure integrity, non-repudiation and a form 
of authentication. Next, the focus will move to data confidentiality.
5.3.4 Keeping Goods Confidential
Any part of a SOAP message or any combination of its sub-structures 
(body, header blocks, etc.) can be encrypted by either a common symmetric key, 
shared by the sender and the receiver, or a key carried in the message in an 
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encrypted form. The XML Encryption standard is brought into WS-Security to 
implement this flexibility. Using encryption ensures that goods carried by the 
vehicle will be confidential and only authorized entities will be able to view it.
When elements are encrypted within a SOAP message, certain elements 
need to be added to the <Security> element.
The <ReferenceList> element from XML Encryption may be used, when 
encrypting elements or element content within a SOAP envelope to create a
manifest of encrypted portions, which are expressed as <EncryptedData>
elements within the envelope. Any element or element content encrypted must be 
replaced by a corresponding <EncryptedData> according to XML Encryption. All 
the <EncryptedData> elements created by this encryption step should be listed in 
<DataReference> elements inside an <ReferenceList> element.
Although in XML Encryption, <ReferenceList> was originally designed to 
be used within an <EncryptedKey> element, implying all the referenced
<EncryptedData> elements are encrypted by the same key. However, this
specification allows <EncryptedData> elements referenced by the same 
<ReferenceList> to be encrypted by different keys. Each encryption key can be 
specified in <KeyInfo> within individual <EncryptedData> elements.
The <EncryptedKey> may be used for carrying an encrypted key when the
encryption step involves encrypting elements or element contents within a SOAP 
envelope with a key, which is in turn to be encrypted by the recipient’s key and 
embedded in the message. This sub-element should have a manifest, that is, a 
<ReferenceList> element, to allow the recipient to know the portions to be 
decrypted with this key. An element or element content to be encrypted by this 
encryption step must be replaced by a corresponding <EncryptedData> according 
to XML Encryption. All the <EncryptedData> elements created by this encryption 
step should be listed in the <ReferenceList> element inside the sub-element.
This construct is useful when encryption is done by a randomly generated
symmetric key that is in turn encrypted by the public key of the recipient.
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XML Encryption specifies that <EncryptedKey> elements may be 
specified within the <EncryptedData> elements, but the WS-Security strongly 
recommends that <EncryptedKey> elements be placed in the <Security> header.
Required implemented block encryption algorithms, which are designed 
for encrypting and decrypting data in fixed size, multiple octet blocks, are
TripleDES, AES-128 and AES-256. AES-192 is optional (Eastlake & Reagle,
2002). It is important to consider that it has been approved by the National 
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) that AES replaces the vulnerable 
DES (Schneider & Daemen, 2001).
There are no specific algorithms specified for stream encryption, but
merely guidelines. This type of encryption might lead to many interoperability 
problems, because it is not standardized and can be different from other 
implementations (Eastlake & Reagle, 2002).
Key Transport algorithms are public key encryption algorithms especially
specified for encrypting and decrypting keys. Since Key Transport algorithms
make use of public key algorithms, they are not efficient for the transport of any 
amounts of data significantly larger than symmetric keys. It is required by the 
implementation to support RSA-v1.5 and RSA-OAEP (Optimal Asymmetric 
Encryption Padding) when keys are transported within a message. The RSA-v1.5 
Key Transport algorithm is used in conjunction with TripleDES and 
Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) of S/MIME. The RSA-v2 Key Transport 
algorithm is used in conjunction with AES and CMS. RSA-OAEP must be 
implemented to transport 128 and 256-bit keys. RSA-OAEP always uses the 
MGF1 (mask generation function) with the SHA1 message digest function (Ibid).
A key-agreement algorithm provides for a shared secret key to be created
based on a shared secret computed from certain types of compatible public keys 
from both the sender and the recipient. The Diffie-Hellman algorithm is optional 
for implementations to use. XML Encryption does not provide an on-line key 
agreement negotiation protocol. This is outside the scope of the XML Encryption 
specification (Ibid) and this dissertation.
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Symmetric Key Wrap algorithms are shared secret key encryption 
algorithms especially specified for encrypting and decrypting symmetric keys; 
TripleDES, AES-128 and AES-256 are required for implementations and AES-
192 is optional (Ibid).
Message Digest algorithms are used within RSA-OAEP encryption as a
hash function and in connection with the HMAC message authentication code 
method as described by the XML Digital Signature specification. The SHA-1 
algorithm is required by implementations whereas the SHA-256 is recommended. 
SHA-512 and RIPEMD-160 are optional for implementations (Ibid). Hashing 
algorithms such as MD4, MD5, HAVAL-128, RIPEMD and SHA-0 (superseded 
by SHA-1) are not recommended to use since vulnerabilities were detected 
(NIST, 2004). Reputable researchers have found that a brute force attack can 
result in collisions occurring in the SHA-1 hash algorithm. Many digital 
signatures include contextual information that makes this attack difficult to carry 
out in practice. Other applications of hash functions, such as Hash-Based Message 
Authentication Codes (HMACs) and key derivation are believed unaffected by 
this attack. NIST has planned to phase out SHA-1 in favour of the larger and 
stronger hash functions (SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-512) by 2010 
due to advances in computing power. New developments are encouraged to use 
the larger and stronger hash functions (NIST, 2005).
Canonicalization of XML is a method of consistently serializing XML into
an octet stream as is necessary prior to encrypting XML. Two algorithms are
available: Inclusive Canonicalization and Exclusive Canonicalization (Eastlake & 
Reagle, 2002).
There are a variety of different algorithms available and the choice of
which one to recommend is difficult. With implementing XML Encryption, goods 
can be kept secret from third parties and only the intended receiver can access the 
data. 
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5.3.5 Adding a Clock
It is often important that a recipient is able to determine the freshness of a 
message (how long ago was the message sent). This is important to prevent replay 
attacks. The WS-Security specification defines and illustrates time references in 
terms of the dateTime type defined in the XML Schema. It is recommended that 
all time references use this type. It is further recommended that all time references 
be in the Universal Time Co-ordinated (UTC) format (Nadalin et al., 2004).
The <Timestamp> element provides a mechanism for expressing the 
creation and expiration times of the security semantics in a message. This element 
is specified as a child of the <Security> header and may only be present, at most, 
once per SOAP actor/role header (Ibid).
The <Created> child element represents the creation time of the security
semantics. This element is optional and can only be specified once. The 
<Expires> element represents the expiration of the security semantics. This 
element is optional and can only appear once in the <Timestamp> element. It is 
recommended that a recipient ignores an expired message. A fault code 
(MessageExpired) is provided if the recipient wants to inform the requestor that 
its security semantics were expired (Ibid).
5.4 Error Handling
There are many circumstances where an error can occur while processing 
security information. The standard WS-Security faults are listed in Table 1. It is 
up to the implementation to decide how different fault messages are handled.
5.5 Conclusion
This chapter focused on securing the message (vehicle) by using 
confidentiality, integrity, non-repudiation, authentication and authorization 
mechanisms.
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Table 1: Error messages within WS-Security
Digital Signatures alone do not provide message authentication. A signed
message can be recorded and re-sent, resulting in a replay attack. It is important to 
combine digital signatures with timestamps, sequence numbers, expirations or 
message correlation to ensure the uniqueness of the message, to prevent this.
It is recommended that timestamps be cached for a given period of time. 
As a guideline, a value of five minutes can be used as a minimum to detect
replays. Timestamps older than that given time period should be rejected in 
interactive scenarios. Timestamps need to be signed to assure the receiver that the 
IDs and timestamps have not been altered or forged in transit.
The use of digital signatures to verify the identity of the sender requires
the sender to prove the possession of the private key. A challenge-response type 
of protocol can be used.
It must be considered that when trust is built into systems using digital 
signatures, that other technologies needed to be incorporated, such as certificate 
evaluation.
The use of security tokens that do not include signatures requires the
requestor to digitally sign them to ensure that they are not altered during transit.
Error Message Description
UnsupportedSecurityToken An unsupported token was provided 
UnsupportedAlgorithm An unsupported signature or encryption algorithm 
was used
InvalidSecurity An error was discovered processing the 
<Security> header 
InvalidSecurityToken An invalid security token was provided 
FailedAuthentication The security token could not be authenticated or 
authorized 
FailedCheck The signature or decryption was invalid 
SecurityTokenUnavailable Referenced security token could not be retrieved 
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The combining of encryption and digital signing over a common data item 
may introduce some cryptographic vulnerability. Encrypting digitally signed data, 
while leaving the digital signature in the clear, may allow plain text guessing.
Therefore, care must be taken when enforcing the discussed security 
mechanisms to ensure a reliable and secure messaging environment. WS-Security
defines standardized methods of using these mechanisms to ensure 
interoperability.
Using the mechanisms as described in this chapter will help secure the
vehicle to transport goods from one depot to another. Certain data types, such as 
multimedia, can result in very bulky messages. This kind of data and digital 
signatures can be optimized for better performance. The next chapter focuses on 
vehicle optimization.
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Chapter 6
Optimizing the Vehicle
Different types of vehicles are used for different kinds of conditions and 
work-loads. Generally, a vehicle is optimized according to specific needs and 
working conditions to ensure optimum performance to complete the job.
Although XML is flexible and globally accepted, it is not always logical to
use for presenting certain types of data. Two common forms of such data types 
are media data and data that include digital signatures. This is because media data 
already has highly standardized formats where compression plays a major role,
and the binary integrity of digital signatures will not be preserved when serialized 
into structured XML. These types of data which are difficult (or senseless) to be 
represented in structured XML are called opaque data. Several solutions have 
been proposed to represent such data, which include SOAP Messages with 
Attachments (SwA), WS-Attachments using Direct Internet Message 
Encapsulation (DIME), the Proposed Infoset Addendum to SOAP Messages with 
Attachments (PASwA) which has largely been incorporated into the SOAP 
Message Transmission Optimization Mechanism (MTOM), Base64-encoding the 
data within XML, and binary XML formats (Powell, 2004).
In this chapter, the focus will be on optimizing the vehicle carrying the
message to ensure best performance and data representation. The emphasis is on 
the latest, the SOAP MTOM specification.
6.1 Cargo Loading Approaches
Several methods, previously mentioned, are available to transport opaque 
data. These approaches will be discussed in the next five sections, describing how 
large cargo can be loaded onto the vehicles.
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6.1.1 XML Representation
XML Represenation represents the data in a structured XML format (Bray 
et al., 2004). The obvious problem and downfall for representing opaque data in 
this manner is that it bloats the data tremendously and standardized, accepted data 
formats already exist. Using this representation will cause the cargo to be larger 
and will affect the performance of the vehicle.
Converting to XML is ideal for interoperability. Its composability with 
other Web Service specifications is excellent, but its efficiency is debatable, 
because it depends on how the data is represented. However, it is not a viable 
solution for sending opaque data (Powell, 2004). Some of the alternative 
mechanisms will be briefly discussed below.
6.1.2 SOAP with Attachments (SwA)
The SOAP with Attachments specification was one of the first attempts to 
solve the opaque problem. It defines a standard transportation structure for 
associating a SOAP message with one or more attachments in a multipart MIME 
message (Barton, Thatte, & Nielsen, 2000).
Interoperability may be considered decent when implementing this 
specification. The problem, however, lies in the attachment profile where Web 
service interoperability is ignored because SwA breaks away from the Web 
services model. SwA is not compatible with WS-Security, which is a fundamental
problem (Powell, 2004). The W3C is promoting MTOM above SwA. The MTOM 
specification superseded the SwA specification (Nielson, & Ruellan, 2004). It can 
be claimed that MTOM is a refinement of SwA enabling it to work within the 
composability of advanced Web services. SwA composability with other Web 
Service specifications is poor, because there does not exist an encompassing 
SOAP envelope to build upon. Although the efficiency of SwA is considered 
good, it is not deemed as efficient and streamlined as the DIME and WS-
Attachments approach. However, opaque data can be sent in its raw form without 
Base64-encoding. SwA is not interoperable with Microsoft platforms (Powell, 
2004).
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6.1.3 WS-Attachment using DIME
DIME and WS-Attachments is a faster and more efficient solution to the 
attachment approach with opaque data than SOAP with Attachments. DIME is a 
packaging mechanism that allows multiple records of randomly formatted data to 
be streamed together (Powell, 2002).
It has the same composability problems as SwA. The efficiency of this 
approach is very good, because DIME is a simple binary format for transmitting 
raw data and supports such efficiencies as manoeuvring easily between message 
records. However, DIME and WS-Attachments do not provide wide 
interoperability and there is little reason to implement it (Powell, 2004).
6.1.4 Base64-Encoding
This approach has been in use for some time. Base64-encoding has some 
valuable benefits, such as its seamless integration in SOAP envelopes. Base64-
encoding is a well-known standard and it has better size-efficiency than structured 
XML. Interoperability is excellent when using Base64-encoding because the data 
is understood on every platform which supports XML. The problem exists, as 
with XML Representation, that the opaque data included in the message is not 
necessarily interoperable. Composability is excellent, because all the Web Service 
specifications can be applied to a Base64-encoded XML element. The efficiency 
of Base64-encoding in relation to message size is more efficient than structured 
XML, but it still bloats the data by about 33%, even when single byte characters 
are used. The character set for Base64-encoding does not require multi-byte 
characters, so through the use of UTF-8 encoding the extra 100% increase in size 
can be avoided. However, single- and multi-byte encodings within a single XML 
message cannot be mixed. Should the SOAP envelope require multi-byte 
encoding, there is no other choice than a two-fold increase in size. Base64-
encoding is one of the best ways to transmit opaque data when transport size 
efficiency is not a concern (Powell, 2004).
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6.1.5 Message Transmission Optimization Mechanism 
(MTOM)
Message Transmission Optimization Mechanism combines the 
composability of Base64-encoding with the transport efficiency of SOAP with 
Figure 11: Process for creating an MTOM message
Attachments. The opaque data is handled in nearly the same manner as SwA. It is 
streamed as binary data and added as one of the MIME message parts. Figure 11 
illustrates the process for creating an MTOM message. At the Infoset level, just
before message serialization, the opaque data is accessed and is temporarily
treated as Base64-encoded text. For example, a WS-Security layer creating a 
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digital signature will stream the binary data through a Base64-encoding layer 
because it calculates the signature. The Base64-encoded data is not actually 
transferred, nor is it held in memory, or decoded back into binary. The same 
concepts apply on deserialization. The raw binary is transferred directly to the 
higher layer. Any processing layers that access it would do so through a 
temporary Base64-encoded layer (Powell, 2004).
Interoperability with MTOM is potentially great because it composes of 
Base64-encoding and, also, there is the transport efficiency factor. Composability 
with other Web Service specifications is excellent because the end result of an
MTOM transfer is a SOAP envelope, which allows the application of all higher-
level Web service protocols. The efficiency of using MTOM is excellent. 
Although the MIME Multipart data transfer is not as efficient as transferring raw 
data as with DIME, it can still transfer data without additional bloating (Ibid).
6.2 A Deeper look at MTOM
The previous section discussed the different approaches available to 
handling opaque data. It is clear that the MTOM standard is preferred for loading 
the cargo onto the vehicle because it is interoperable, efficient and composable.
The MTOM standard contains more elements than discussed so far. In this 
section, the MTOM standard is explored in more detail. The main reference 
source is Gudgin, Mendelsohn, Nottingham, & Ruellan, (2005a), unless otherwise 
specified. The official W3C SOAP Message Transmission Optimization 
Mechanism Specification defines three ways of optimizing the transmission of 
SOAP messages.
6.2.1 Abstract SOAP Transmission Optimization Feature
The first option, called the Abstract SOAP Transmission Optimization 
feature, is an abstract feature of optimizing the transmission and/or wire format of 
a SOAP message. This is done by selectively encoding portions of the message, 
while still presenting an XML Infoset to the SOAP application. Optimization is 
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available only for element content that is formatted according to the Base64-
Binary standard data type and does not contain any whitespace characters, 
preceding, inline with, or following the non-whitespace content. Therefore, only 
cargo components consisting of Base64-binary will be optimized.
This one-to-one correspondence between such standard forms and values
in the value space of Base64-Binary allows MTOM implementations to typically 
optimize data through transmitting a compact representation of the value instead 
of the less compact character sequence. At the receiver, the character form can be 
reconstructed, if necessary.
The use of this Abstract SOAP Transmission Optimization option is a
hop-by-hop contract between one SOAP node and the next in the SOAP message 
path. It provides no mandatory convention for the optimization of SOAP 
transmission through intermediaries. No changes or restrictions to the SOAP 
processing model are introduced by this optimization feature at an intermediary.
Many intermediaries will relay the contents of the SOAP body without any
changes. It provides optional means through which binding implementations may 
choose to facilitate the efficient pass-through of optimized data contained within 
the headers or bodies relayed by an intermediary. This results in a vehicle passing 
through stops (intermediaries) along the path without altering the cargo.
The identification of element information items that contain Base64-
encoded data in an accepted standard format is implementation-dependent. This 
might lead to interoperability issues. The receiving node, when receiving an 
optimized SOAP message, must reconstruct the Envelope Infoset from the 
optimized SOAP message. The receiving node performs SOAP processing on the 
reconstructed Infoset.
Implementations only have to reconstruct those portions of an Infoset
actually needed for processing, or to present information from the message in a 
form convenient for efficient processing.
64
6.2.2 Optimized MIME Multipart/Related Serialization of 
SOAP messages
The second option is called the Optimized MIME Multipart/Related 
Serialization of SOAP messages. It describes an optimized MIME 
Multipart/Related serialization of SOAP messages implementing the Abstract 
SOAP Transmission Optimization feature in a binding-independent way. This 
implementation relies on the XML-binary optimized Packaging (XOP) format 
(Gudgin et al., 2005a). The XOP defines a means for more efficient serializing of
XML Infosets containing certain types of content, e.g. opaque data (Gudgin,
Mendelsohn, Nottingham, & Ruellan, 2005b).
The SOAP envelope Infoset is transmitted as a MIME Multipart/Related 
XOP package. The sending of a SOAP message using the MIME 
Multipart/Related serialization indicates that the SOAP Envelope Infoset is 
serialized as specified in the Creating XOP packages section of the XML-binary 
Optimized Packaging (XOP) Specification. This specification provides guidelines 
on how the cargo must be processed before loading, to ensure optimization.
<soap:Envelope
    xmlns:soap='http://www.w3.org/2003/05/soap-envelope' 
    xmlns:xmlmime='http://www.w3.org/2004/11/xmlmime'>
  <soap:Body>
    <m:data xmlns:m='http://example.org/stuff'>
      <m:photo 
  xmlmime:contentType='image/png'>/aWKKapGGyQ=</m:photo>
      <m:sig 
  xmlmime:contentType='application/pkcs7-signature'>Faa7vROi2VQ=</m:sig>
    </m:data>
  </soap:Body>
</soap:Envelope>
Figure 12: An example of an XML Infoset before XOP processing
Figure 12 illustrates an XML Infoset containing Base64-encoded data 
before XOP processing. The Base64-Binary data is identified within the message. 
The identified data is then replaced by an <xop:Include> element referencing the 
binary data placed in the MIME part of the message. Figure 13 shows an 
optimized XML Infoset.
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MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: Multipart/Related;boundary=MIME_boundary;
    type="application/xop+xml";
    start="<mymessage.xml@example.org>";
    startinfo="application/soap+xml; action=\"ProcessData\""
Content-Description: A SOAP message with my pic and sig in it
--MIME_boundary
Content-Type: application/xop+xml; 
    charset=UTF-8; 
    type="application/soap+xml; action=\"ProcessData\""
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Content-ID: <mymessage.xml@example.org>
<soap:Envelope
    xmlns:soap='http://www.w3.org/2003/05/soap-envelope'
    xmlns:xmlmime='http://www.w3.org/2004/11/xmlmime'>
  <soap:Body>
    <m:data xmlns:m='http://example.org/stuff'>
      <m:photo 
  xmlmime:contentType='image/png'><xop:Include 
    xmlns:xop='http://www.w3.org/2004/08/xop/include' 
    href='cid:http://example.org/me.png'/></m:photo>
      <m:sig 
  xmlmime:contentType='application/pkcs7-signature'><xop:Include 
    xmlns:xop='http://www.w3.org/2004/08/xop/include' 
    href='cid:http://example.org/my.hsh'/></m:sig>
    </m:data>
  </soap:Body>
</soap:Envelope>
--MIME_boundary
Content-Type: image/png
Content-Transfer-Encoding: binary
Content-ID: <http://example.org/me.png>
// binary octets for png
--MIME_boundary
Content-Type: application/pkcs7-signature
Content-Transfer-Encoding: binary
Content-ID: <http://example.org/my.hsh>
// binary octets for signature
--MIME_boundary--
Figure 13: An example of an XML Infoset serialized as a XOP package
The result is a MIME Multipart/Related XOP package consisting of one
body part, the root, containing an XML representation of the modified SOAP
envelope, with an additional part used to contain the binary representation of each 
element that was optimized (Gudgin et al., 2005a). The Base64-encoded content 
of the <m:photo> and <m:sig> elements in Figure 13 have been replaced by a 
<xop:Include> element. The binary octets have been serialized into separate 
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MIME parts. It should be noted that these examples use Assigning Media Types 
to Binary Data in XML to identify the media type of the content of the <m:photo> 
and <m:sig> elements. In practice the optimized form is likely to be much smaller 
than the original XML Infoset (Gudgin et al., 2005b).
The <xop:Include> element tags are used by the vehicle depot to identify 
the optimized cargo carried by the vehicle.
The SOAP Envelope Infoset is reconstructed from the MIME 
Multipart/Related XOP package when receiving a SOAP message using the 
optimized MIME Multipart/Related serialization. The <xop:Include> elements 
need to be identified and replaced with the Base64-encoded data.
A third option, called the HTTP SOAP Transmission Optimization Feature 
is available and will be discussed next.
6.2.3 HTTP SOAP Transmission Optimization Feature
The HTTP SOAP Transmission Optimization Feature uses the Optimized
MIME Multipart/Related serialization of SOAP messages for describing an
implementation of the Abstract Transmission Optimization feature for the SOAP 
1.2 HTTP binding.
The use of an implementation of the HTTP SOAP Transmission 
Optimization Feature serializes the SOAP message and inserts the MIME headers 
of the resulting MIME Multipart/Related XOP Package as HTTP headers and the 
rest of the package into the HTTP body. This feature, on the receiving side, 
extracts the MIME headers from the HTTP headers and the rest of the MIME 
Multipart/Related XOP Package from the HTTP body and deserializes it in the 
same way as described in the previous section.
An implementation of the SOAP HTTP binding, when receiving a SOAP
message, will determine whether the HTTP SOAP Transmission optimization
feature is used by checking for the presence of the application/xop+xml media
type.
This concludes the three features available in the MTOM specification for 
optimizing opaque data.
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6.3 Conclusion
The opaque data problem with Web services is a dilemma that has a 
number of proposed solutions. These solutions have suffered from either a lack of
industry acceptance or the lack of support for the composability of Web service 
protocols which provide the rich set of functionality that makes these Web 
services so appealing.
The SOAP Message Transmission Optimization Mechanism (MTOM) 
appears to be a great solution that treats the opaque data as part of the SOAP
envelope at the Infoset level, but serializes the data for efficient transport over 
MIME messages. MTOM works in the highly composable world of Web service 
protocols and allows for the efficient transfer of opaque data.
This enables the vehicle to efficiently transport opaque data from one 
depot to another.
Since the transport protocol of choice is HTTP in the proposed model, it is
recommended that the HTTP SOAP Transmission Optimization Feature is used 
for its composability and transfer efficiency.
A secure, routable and optimized vehicle is defined; it is now relevant to
look at the route the vehicle is going to take to get to its destination. This route 
needs to be secure to guarantee safety of the vehicle whilst traveling. The next 
chapter focuses on securing the pathway for the vehicle.
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Chapter 7
Securing the Highway
As for a highway, it is important that there are rules to guarantee the safety 
of the vehicles using the Internet. The Internet is an insecure network. All the 
solutions used to create a secure network require many elements, such as security 
policies and standards that define what needs to be protected, a set of procedures 
stating implementation details and a set of technologies that provide the 
protection (Cisco, 2000). This chapter focuses on two state-of-the-art security 
standards ensuing correct security measurements for data and information 
traveling over a network if they are properly implemented. Internet Protocol 
Security (IPSec) and TLS/SSL are the two virtual private network (VPN) 
standards of choice.
Younglove (2000) describes a secure VPN as a means to allow users to 
access network resources securely through a combination of tunneling, 
encryption, authentication, access controls, auditing technologies and services 
used to transport traffic over the Internet or any insecure network that uses the 
TCP/IP protocol suite. VPNs can support transactions over the Internet to make it 
more cost-effective by tying business partners and suppliers together and reducing 
multiple communication links and legacy equipment.
Some widely used cryptographic algorithms are mentioned. Each 
algorithm has certain strengths and weaknesses. The strength or weakness of a 
cryptographic algorithm relates to the ease with which it can be broken without 
the key (Clark, 2002).
 Symmetric Algorithms - Data Encryption Standard (DES), Triple 
DES (temporary replacement for DES), Advanced Encryption 
Standard (AES, replacement for DES), International Data 
Encryption Algorithm (IDEA);
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 Asymmetric Algorithms - River, Shamir, and Adleman (RSA), 
Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem (ECC);
 Hash Algorithms - Message-Digest Algorithm (MD5), Secure 
Hash Algorithm (SHA).
The principles and tools for cryptography and security, previously 
mentioned, play an important role in evaluating which standard will be the most 
suitable to use within the scope of this research. First, the focus will be on IPSec. 
The outcome is a selection of security protocols that will work in concert with 
other security mechanisms helping user organizations become secure global 
networked businesses.
7.1 IPSec
A VPN requires a tunneling protocol and a means to authenticate the 
tunnel origin. Internet Protocol Security (IPSec) has become the de facto industry 
standard for an IP-based VPN infrastructure because it can provide a highly 
secure, authenticated VPN satisfying e-business traffic requirements (Younglove, 
2000). IPSec allows a secured private network to be physically spread over the 
entire Internet (Kant, Iyer, & Mohapatra, 2000).
Oppliger (1998) discusses threats like password sniffing, IP spoofing, 
session hijacking and DoS which are a reality when using the public Internet. 
IPSec aims to address these kinds of threats and provide a safe communication 
means.
IPSec is developed by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) as a 
proposed standard for Layer 3 real-time communication security. Perlman and 
Kaufman (2000) explain that in a real-time security system, an initiator, initiates 
communication with a responder system. Each participant is authenticated by 
providing secret knowledge to each other. A secret key is then established for the 
protection (integrity and/or privacy) of the data for the remainder of the session. 
The term, real-time, is used to distinguish it from a system such as secure e-mail, 
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in which the initiator can create an encrypted, signed message for the responder 
system without first interacting with the responder.
IPSec is a Layer 3 protocol, which was designed as an end-to-end 
mechanism for ensuring data security in IP-based communications. IPSec allows 
IP payloads to be encrypted and encapsulated in an IP header for secure transfer 
across the network (Younglove, 2000).
Perlman and Kaufman (2000) state that IPSec can be seen as a protocol 
that operates between Layer 3 (IP) and Layer 4 (TCP, UDP or any other Layer 4 
protocol). This means that it encrypts each data packet separately from others and 
if packets are lost or delayed, Layer 4 (the software that requests transmission of 
lost packets) sees only the validated information.
IPSec is implemented at the network layer in terms of packet construction 
and the TCP/IP stack. Figure 14 illustrates the location of the IPSec protocols in 
the stack.
Figure 14: Location of IPSec protocols in a TCP/IP stack (Clark, 2002)
The arrows show the path of a packet traveling from Host A to Host B. 
Host B implements IPSec as a separate layer, whereas Host A and the Routers 
include IPSec as part of the network layer. These are two different types of host 
implementation which is known as Operating System Integrated (OSI) or Bump 
in the Stack (BITS). There are drawbacks and advantages in both types of 
implementation. OSI can be difficult for external companies providing solutions 
to existing networks. OSI can utilize services in an existing network layer. IPSec 
physically interacts with the stack by modifying, encapsulating or inserting data 
into the IP packet before it is passed to the Data Link Layer as it exits. It modifies 
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the packet again before it is passed up to the Network or Transport Layer on the 
way in (Clark, 2002).
Oppliger (1998) states that, with IPSec operating between Layers 3 and 4, 
a major advantage is that it can provide security services transparently to both 
applications and users. This transparency sets IPSec apart from security protocols 
that operate above the Internet layer. IPSec is likely to be used in conjunction 
with, and complementing, other security technologies, mechanisms and protocols. 
Examples of such technologies can include firewalls and strong authentication 
mechanisms for access control, and higher layer security protocols for end-to-end 
communication security.
Figure 15: An overview of the IPSec architecture
Figure 15 is an overview of the IPSec architecture. The IPSec protocols 
generally operate in a router or security gateway (firewall). Each IPSec module 
contains implementations of the IP Security and Internet Key Management 
Protocols (IKMP) (Oppliger, 1998). IPSec defines which information to add to an 
IP packet to enable confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity controls and defines 
how to encrypt the packet data (Cisco, 2000). This consists of the data encodings 
available in IPSec, namely Authentication Header (AH) and Encapsulating 
Security Payload (ESP) (Perlman & Kaufman, 2000). The key exchange portion 
is carried out by the Internet Key Exchange (IKE) which negotiates the security 
associations between the two entities and exchanges key material. It is not 
necessary to use IKE, but manually configuring security associations is a difficult 
and manually intensive process. IKE should be used in most real-world 
applications to enable large-scale secure communications (Cisco, 2000).
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IPSec assumes that a security association is in place and does not have a 
mechanism in place for creating that association. It was previously mentioned that 
the IETF breaks the process into two parts. IPSec provides the packet-level 
processing, while the IKMP negotiates the security associations. IETF chose IKE 
as the standard method of configuring security associations for IPSec. IKE creates 
an authenticated, secure tunnel between the two entities and negotiates the 
security association for IPSec. This process requires that the two entities 
authenticate themselves to each other and establish shared keys. A security 
association describes a negotiated set of parameters between communicating 
peers, using IKE, which was formerly known as the Internet Security Association 
Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP/Oakley), to communicate securely using 
certain security services. IKE can authenticate devices by using digital certificates 
to create large encryption networks. IPSec will not scale to the Internet without 
digital certificate support (Cisco, 2000). IKE uses some key associated with the 
parties, such as a pre-shared secret key or public keys of the individuals to 
authenticate and establish a session key. One side of the tunnel offers a set of 
algorithms, and the other side accepts one, or rejects the entire connection. A 
shared key is derived for IPSec using the Diffie-Hellman algorithm. After the 
exchange, the remainder of the session is cryptographically protected with the 
session key (Perlman & Kaufman, 2000).
The Security Association (SA) is uniquely identified by a randomly 
chosen unique number called the security parameter index (SPI) and the 
destination IP address. A system sending a packet that requires IPSec protection 
looks up the SA in its database, applies the specified processing, and inserts the 
SPI from the SA into the IPSec header. The IPSec peer that receives the packet, 
looks up the SA in its database using the destination address and the SPI. It will 
then process the packet as required. The SA is seen as a statement of the 
negotiated security policy between two devices (Cisco, 2000).
A security policy database, which a user or system administrator 
establishes and maintains within the IPSec module, contains the requirements for 
the specific level of protection. Each application has its IP packets selected for a 
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particular processing mode, matching IP and transport layer header information 
(IP source and destination address, port number, etc.) against entries in the 
database. A SA affords each packet IPSec security services, discards it, or allows 
it to bypass IPSec protocols entirely. Each SA is uniquely identified by a triad 
consisting of an SPI, an IP destination address and a security protocol identifier
(which refers to the AH or ESP protocol). The SA database contains an entry for 
each association that defines its security parameters (Oppliger, 1998).
Authentication can be configured to use a User name and Password (such 
as Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service (RADIUS)), User name and 
Token plus Pin (such as RSA SecurID) or a X.509 digital certificates (such as 
Entrust or VeriSign) (OpenReach Inc, 2002).
As Figure 15 illustrates, IPSec contains the AH and the ESP Protocols, 
which either alone or in combination provide the SA with corresponding services. 
The securing of bidirectional communications between two hosts or security 
gateways requires that two security associations must be established and 
maintained, one in each direction (Oppliger, 1998). AH and ESP are responsible 
for creating the secure tunneling (OpenReach Inc, 2002).
The AH Protocol provides connectionless data integrity and data origin 
authenticity of the IP Packet for the protection of its payload, but not necessarily 
confidentiality of the packet itself. Depending on the cryptographic algorithm 
used and method of keying, it can support digital signatures to provide non-
repudiation services. The AH Protocol provides an additional header between the 
IP and the transport layer headers that includes some authentication data, which 
the receiver verifies to ensure the source of the data is as claimed. A keyed one-
way hash function, such as MD5 or SHA, is used to compute and verify 
authentication header data. Computing and verifying authentication data in this 
way is more efficient than encrypting and decrypting the entire IP packet. The 
precision of the authentication depends on how the SA was established. If it was 
established with host-oriented keying, only two hosts can be distinguished, not the 
individual user within the host. If it was established with user-oriented keying, 
individual users can be distinguished. Establishing the SA with session-unique 
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keying may also be possible. In that case, individual sessions of the same user can 
be distinguished (Oppliger, 1998).
The ESP Protocol is used to encrypt and encapsulate either the transport 
layer payload or the entire IP packet, depending on the mode of use (transport or 
tunnel). It provides data-confidentiality services and partial traffic-flow 
confidentiality. The IP module includes an IP header and encrypts parts of the IP 
packet accordingly. Encryption is done on the sender side and decryption on the 
receiver side. The precise format of the payload data depends on the particular 
encryption algorithm and transformation in use. Unfortunately, export, import and 
use of specific encryption algorithms is regulated in some countries, limiting the 
service of the protocol, which in some cases cannot be used. Should an 
implementer need only the upper layer protocol to be authenticated, 
authentication using only the ESP protocol is more space-efficient than using both 
protocols (Oppliger, 1998). OpenBSD (2003) recommends the usage of ESP for 
most applications in practice.
Both protocols provide access control services that protect against the 
unauthorized use of a resource or using a resource in an authorized manner 
(Oppliger, 1998). ESP can be configured without the use of authentication or 
without confidentiality (OpenBSD, 2003).
As was previously stated, the ESP protocol provides data integrity, 
authentication and confidentiality (Clark, 2002). According to OpenBSD (2003) 
ESP caters for replay protection, because it makes use of integrity and 
authentication to achieve this goal. The data to be transmitted is encrypted, which 
provides confidentiality, and the entire packet, except for the IP Header and the 
authentication data, is authenticated. An example of an ESP protocol IP packet is 
illustrated in Figure 16.
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Figure 16: ESP protocol IP packet
The AH is a simpler protocol when compared to ESP, but it provides less 
security to the packet. Clark (2002) states that the AH protocol only authenticates 
the data and IP Header. No confidentiality is provided, only integrity and data 
source authentication. Replay protection is a service provided by AH when 
authentication and integrity are implemented as previously stated by OpenBSD 
(2003). ESP requires more processing than AH because decryption/encryption 
requires more processing than hashing (Clark, 2002). An example of an AH 
protocol IP packet is illustrated in Figure 17.
Figure 17: Authentication Header
Since it provides only integrity protection, the necessity of AH is under 
debate. ESP can provide integrity protection or encryption or both. However, the 
integrity protection provided by AH extends to portions of the IP header, whereas 
the integrity protection of ESP is only of the payload. The opponents of AH argue 
that it is unnecessary to protect the IP header and where it is necessary, it could be 
provided by tunnel mode (Perlman & Kaufman, 2000).
As mentioned, IPSec has two main modes of operation, namely Tunnel 
and Transport mode. The packets are modified depending on the mode that IPSec 
operates. Examples of a modified IP packet for the different modes are illustrated 
in Figure 18.
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Figure 18: Modified IP packet
In transport mode, primarily the upper layer protocols are encapsulated 
and protected (Oppliger, 1998). IPSec adds an additional header in between the IP 
and TCP headers, while leaving the data in those headers unchanged, resulting in 
only TCP Header and Data protection (Clark, 2002). According to Clark (2002), 
the destination IP address of the packet is transmitted without protection. This 
mode is used when the destination is a Host IP address. It is simpler and more 
commonly used between systems (Oppliger, 1998).
In tunnel mode, IPSec adds a new IP header (used to route the packet) and 
the IPSec header, with the result that the entire packet is protected by the IPSec 
protocol (Clark, 2002). The original source and destination IP addresses can be 
hidden to provide services ensuring the confidentiality of traffic flows and protect 
against some traffic analysis attacks. The tunneled IP packets are protected using 
IP encapsulation as an enabling technique. It is in encapsulation that the IP 
module authenticates and encrypts outgoing plain text packets and encloses them 
in outer network layer headers, which are used to route the packets through the
network. The receiving network layer protocol module decapsulates the incoming 
packets, strips off the outer network layer headers, and authenticates and decrypts 
the inner packets and forwards them to their final destination. IP encapsulation 
requires no changes to existing Internet routing infrastructure. The fact that 
authenticated and encrypted IP packets have an unencrypted, normal-looking 
outer IP header, they are routed as usual and processed at their final destination. 
The association must be in tunnel mode when one end of a SA is a security 
gateway. The exception is when traffic is destined for a security gateway, and the 
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security gateway is acting as a host; in this case the transport mode is allowed 
(Oppliger, 1998).
In the tunnel mode, an attacker can only determine the tunnel endpoints 
and not the true source and destination of the tunneled packets. Generally, IPSec 
is deployed with tunnel mode. This allows the implementation of IPSec in the 
network architecture without modifying the operating system or any applications 
on the PCs, servers, and hosts (Cisco, 2000).
End systems and applications that do not need any changes have the 
advantage of strong security. The encrypted packets look like ordinary IP packets 
and they can be easily routed through any IP network, such as the Internet, 
without changes to the intermediate networking equipment. The only devices 
aware of the encryption are the end points (Ibid).
It should be noted that IPSec RFCs contain parts that are mandatory for 
compliance and areas that are optional. Clearly this can lead to both functionality 
and security problems between different implementations of the IPSec protocols. 
The purpose of IPSec is to provide various security services to traffic traveling 
between a source and destination. The destination or source may be a router or a 
host. The services can be applied to all packets, or only to specific types of traffic, 
e.g. Telnet or Ftp (Clark, 2002).
An IPSec implementation using a low-grade encryption could then greatly 
affect the strength of the security. An example is the DES algorithm, which can be 
cracked using a fast computer and some cracking software easily available on the 
Internet. IPSec makes allowances for new algorithms to be added to the IPSec 
protocol suite to counter threats (Clark, 2002). Encryption algorithms that can be 
used with IPSec are 56-bit DES, 112- or 168-bit 3DES, 128-, 192- or 256-bit AES 
or no algorithm at all (OpenReach Inc, 2002).
Certain vulnerabilities exist in IPSec according to (Clark, 2002). However, 
most of them occur with the implementation. An example that Clark (2002) uses 
is that when implementing IPSec using Windows 2000, the default wizards do not 
set up a proper implementation. Thought must be given to the fact that expensive 
and powerful equipment can be rendered useless through poor configuration. 
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IPSec can be implemented in the following ways: host-to-host, host-to-network 
(router) or network-to-network (OpenBSD, 2003).
IPSec combines several different security technologies into a complete 
system to provide confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity. In particular, IPSec 
uses (Cisco, 2000):
 Diffie-Hellman key exchange for deriving key material between 
peers on a public network;
 Public key cryptography for signing the Diffie-Hellman exchanges 
to guarantee the identity of the two parties and to avoid man-in-
the-middle attacks;
 Bulk encryption algorithms, such as DES, AES, for encrypting the 
data;
 Keyed hash algorithms, such as HMAC, combined with traditional 
hash algorithms such as MD5 or SHA for providing packet 
authentication; and
 Digital certificates signed by a certificate authority to act as digital 
ID cards.
IPSec, as previously discussed, is implemented at Layer 3, and therefore it 
is possible to deploy it within an operating system without changing the 
applications. Perlman and Kaufman (2000) state that strong security is not 
achieved when IPSec is implemented without changing the applications. It has the 
same effect as putting firewalls between two systems and implementing IPSec 
between the firewalls. It accomplishes the following:
 Traffic between the two nodes will be encrypted, protecting it from 
eavesdroppers;
 IPSec accesses a policy database that specifies which IP addresses 
are allowed to talk to which other IP addresses;
 Some applications perform authentication based on IP addresses. 
The IP address from which the information is received is passed up 
to the application. This form of authentication, with IPSec, can 
become more secure because one of the types of endpoint 
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identifiers IPSec can authenticate is an IP address, making it 
impossible for a node that does not know the key associated with 
that IP address to impersonate the source.
An unmodified application would be unable to detect whether the 
connection was protected by IPSec or not, and would be subject to a configuration 
attack where IPSec is turned off and the application continues to run unprotected. 
Applications will have to change, or another security measurement needs to be 
incorporated, to take full advantage of IPSec. This however can make 
implementations more complex (Perlman & Kaufman, 2000).
7.2 SSL/TLS
This section focuses on the well-known and daily used SSL/TLS security 
protocols. All the major Web browsers and many Web servers implement the 
Secure Socket Layer (SSL) protocol; it plays a major role in e-commerce and e-
business activities on the Web. The newest version of SSL is called Transport 
Layer Security (TLS) by the IETF, and is based on SSL (Entrust, 2003). The SSL 
protocol is intended to provide a practical, widely-applicable, connection-
oriented, application-layer mechanism for Internet client/server communication 
security (Wagner & Schneier, 1997). However, it must be noted that TLS and 
SSL have subtle implementation differences, but application developers should 
notice very little difference and end users notice nothing at all (Chou, 2002).
The SSL protocol runs above TCP and IP and below higher level protocols 
such as HTTP as illustrated in Figure 19. SSL uses TCP and IP on behalf of the 
higher level protocols, and in the process allows an SSL-enabled server to 
authenticate itself to an SSL-client; and it allows the client to authenticate itself to 
the server. Once this is accomplished, an encrypted connection tunnel between 
both machines is established to provide secure, confidential communication 
(Netscape Communication Corporation, 1998).
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Figure 19: SSL operating between the application layer and the TCP/IP layer of the network 
layer
It is a common misunderstanding, according to Entrust (2003), that the 
digital certificate used with SSL dictates the strength of the encryption. The 
strength of SSL is actually dictated by the browser used and the capabilities of the 
server providing the SSL security. Should the Web server support 128-bit 
encryption and the browser supports only 40-bit encryption, only a 40-bit 
encrypted session will be established. This leads to unacceptable security sessions 
which are not secure enough when transmitting sensitive information.
The SSL protocol allows the use of a variety of different cryptographic 
algorithms for authentication, transmitting certificates and establishing session 
keys (Netscape Communication Corporation, 1998).
Secure Socket Layer, according to Netscape Communication Corporation
(1998) provides the following services:
 SSL server authentication - a user establishes the identity of a
server. The SSL-enabled client software (normally a browser) uses 
standard public-key cryptography to determine if its certificate and 
public ID are valid and have been issued by a trusted Certificate 
Authority (CA). This is important when sending sensitive
information;
 SSL client authentication - this functionality allows the server to
confirm the identity of a client. It uses the same techniques as for
server authentication, determining whether the certificate and 
public ID of the client are valid and issued by a trusted CA. This is 
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important if the server needs to send confidential information to 
the client;
 An encrypted SSL connection - a high degree of confidentiality is 
provided by requiring that all information sent between the client 
and the server is encrypted by the sending software and decrypted 
by the receiving software. All data sent over an encrypted SSL 
connection is tamper-proof and the software will detect 
immediately if data has been altered in transit.
Netscape Communication Corporation (1998) mentions two SSL sub-
protocols: the SSL record protocol and the SSL handshake protocol. The SSL 
record protocol defines the format used to transmit data. It provides 
confidentiality, authenticity and replay protection over a connection-oriented 
reliable protocol such as TCP (Wagner & Schneier, 1997). The SSL handshake 
protocol involves using the SSL record protocol to exchange a series of messages 
between an SSL enabled server and an SSL-enabled client when they first 
establish an SSL connection. Wagner and Schneier (1997) state that it is a key-
exchange protocol, which initializes and synchronizes cryptographic states at the 
two endpoints. The following actions facilitate the exchange of the messages 
(Netscape Communication Corporation, 1998):
 Authenticate the server to the client;
 Allow the client and server to select the cryptographic algorithms 
that are supported by both;
 Optionally authenticate the client to the server;
 Use public-key encryption technology to generate shared secrets;
 Establish an encrypted SSL connection.
The SSL protocol uses a combination of public-key and symmetric 
encryption. An SSL session always begins with the SSL Handshake. It is 
summarized as follows (Netscape Communication Corporation, 1998):
 The client browser sends the server the SSL version number, 
cipher settings, randomly generated data and other information of 
the client the server needs to communicate with it;
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 The server sends the client the SSL version number, cipher 
settings, randomly generated data and other information of the 
server needed to communicate with it. The server sends it own 
certificate to authenticate itself and, if needed, it will request the 
certificate of the client;
 The client will authenticate the server by using the information 
received. If the server cannot be authenticated, a secure 
communication session cannot be established;
 The client creates the pre-master secret for the session using all the 
data generated so far by both sides. This pre-master secret is 
encrypted by the client with the public key of the server and sends 
it to the server;
 Should the server have requested client authentication, the client 
sends signed data, its own certificate and the encrypted pre-master 
secret;
 The client is authenticated, if requested. If not authenticated, the 
session will be terminated; otherwise, the server will decrypt the 
pre-master key with its own private key. The server performs a 
series of steps (as does the client using the same pre-master secret) 
to generate the master secret;
 Both the client and the server use the master secret to generate the 
symmetric session keys used during the session to verify its 
integrity;
 The client notifies the server that all further communication is 
encrypted using the session key. It indicates the server that the 
client portion of the handshake is finished;
 The server notifies the client that all communication is encrypted 
with the session key. The server indicates to the client that the 
handshake is finished;
 The handshake is now complete and the SSL session begins.
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Greenfield (2002) summarizes an SSL session as an association between a 
client and a server that defines a set of cryptographic security parameters which 
can be shared among multiple connections. Once a secure connection is 
established, SSL’s task is not yet finished. It has some additional duties to ensure 
a secure transmission. The SSL layer is responsible for segmenting the data that is 
to be sent, identifying it with a message authentication code (MAC), compressing 
and encrypting it, before sending it across the network. At the receiving node, 
SSL decrypts the data, uses the MAC to validate the integrity of the message and 
decompress the data. All the data is reassembled and passed on to the application 
layer for processing (Alcatel, 2003).
The SSL protocol encrypts all application-layer data with an algorithm and 
short-term session key negotiated by the handshake protocol (Wagner & Schneier, 
1997).
There are two other protocols, related to the Record Protocol, within the 
SSL suite, which should be mentioned: The Change Cipher Spec protocol and the 
Alert protocol, which are used during SSL session operation. The Change Cipher 
Spec protocol consists of a single message that serves to signal a change to an 
agreed-upon set of ciphers and keys. The Alert protocol is used to send SSL-
related alerts to the SSL peer. The alert can be fatal or warning messages. Fatal 
messages terminate the connection (Greenfield, 2002).
It must be noted about SSL that once the information is collected at the 
server, it is no longer protected by SSL. SSL protects only the link between the 
server and the browser (RSA Security, 2004). Another concern with the previous 
versions of SSL is that they did not provide client authentication. This means that 
the server did not know who was connected to it and could send confidential 
information to an impersonated client (Rubin & Geer, 1998).
Another issue mentioned by Chou (2002), is that TLS 1.0 and SSL 3.0 are 
not interoperable. The difference is that TLS requires certain encryption 
algorithms that SSL does not. A TLS-server must lower its standards to 
interoperate with SSL 3.0 clients. It must be remembered, that when using public-
key encryption algorithms, this type of encryption is quite CPU-intensive. It is 
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better to use secret keys to counter the intensive computation demands. The secret 
key is encrypted with public-key algorithms to send to the receiver (distribution 
algorithm), and all other messages are encrypted using the shared secret-key. A 
slight variant of the distribution algorithm is the agreement algorithm. Instead of 
sending the actual secret key to the other entity, the two entities exchange their 
public keys and generate a secret key. A very popular algorithm to use for this 
type of encryption, is the Diffie-Hellman algorithm. SSL supports Diffie-
Hellman, but the majority of SSL transactions do not use this public-key 
agreement approach; rather they use the RSA public-key algorithm to distribute 
secret-keys (Chou, 2002).
Both these VPN protocols have been discussed, but how do they compare 
with each other? This is discussed next.
7.3 IPSec vs. SSL/TLS
Internet Protocol Security provides the standard security needs, such as 
data integrity, authentication, confidentiality and replay protection. IPSec is 
flexible and can be implemented according to specific security policies of an 
enterprise. A single IPSec tunnel secures all the communication between two end-
points regardless of the data type. IPSec operates independently and is transparent 
to the application, making it more scalable. IPSec operating at the network layer 
gives the impression of being connected to a LAN, making it more powerful than 
SSL, because the applications do not have to know anything about IPSec. Access 
to an IPSec network is limited to only IPSec clients and this provides stronger 
security. Both sides must agree upon encryption strength before a tunnel can be 
established. IPSec can be configured to accept only certain digital certificates. 
Any IP protocol can be used with IPSec (OpenReach Inc, 2002).
The flexibility that IPSec offers brings complexity. Deployment, 
configuration and management can be quite difficult. Certain VPN providers have 
developed their own IPSec software clients to work with their IPSec gateways. 
Normally these are closed proprietary systems that are not interoperable with the 
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products of other vendors. It is not commonly available for all operating systems. 
The fact that IPSec limits access to only IPSec clients makes it more secure, but 
limits accessibility and mobility. Manual configuration of IPSec is difficult for 
non-technical personnel. Deployment is labour-intensive, expensive and experts 
might be needed. These factors can slow down the VPN deployment (Ibid).
Secure Socket Layer is flexible because the security level can be defined 
to fit the needs of the business. SSL operates through Web browsers which are 
SSL-compatible. Web browsers are familiar to most of the users. They are 
embedded in almost every type of user device. SSL makes accessibility very 
mobile. No special purpose software is required. SSL is often referred to as client-
less because the required technology is on the server-side to handle the SSL 
sessions. Users are registered easily by enabling their user name and password. 
SSL is scalable and quick to deploy. The total cost of SSL is less than IPSec, 
because no client software is needed and the deployment and management burden 
is less (Ibid).
Each application is secured one at a time using SSL. All common 
browsers support SSL, but not all applications. SSL negotiates encryption strength 
from the strongest to the weakest. Enterprises cannot guarantee the use of strong 
encryption. SSL has an inferior authentication implementation compared to 
IPSec. An SSL browser prompts the user to determine if the digital certificate is 
acceptable. This requires the end-user to verify that the certificate by the server is 
valid. This can lead to the risk of imposters. Another security threat is posed 
when, used from an unknown machine, data can be cached in memory and 
exposed to unauthorised entities. Therefore, when SSL is used, consideration 
should be given to limiting access to non-sensitive corporate data. All applications 
are not suitable for use through a Web browser (Ibid).
SSL is another real-time communication protocol, according to Perlman 
and Kaufman (2000), which operates above Layer 4 encrypting an entire stream 
rather than the individual packets. It is left to TCP to break the stream into the 
individual packets and make sure that it all arrives, in order, before presenting 
them to the SSL at the receiving node. An argument for operating above Layer 4 
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is that security can be deployed without changes to the operating system, because 
typically all the layers up to and including Layer 4 are implemented in the kernel. 
A problem that arises with operating above TCP is that TCP will, by definition, 
not be participating in the cryptography and has no way of knowing whether a 
particular packet is cryptographically valid. It can occur that an active attacker 
injects a TCP packet with a valid sequence number, the TCP implementation at 
the receiver acknowledges the packet and passes it up to SSL. SSL detects the 
data is invalid, but it is too late, since there is no way for SSL to inform TCP that 
the data it had accepted was invalid. When the original cryptographically valid 
packet arrives with a sequence number that TCP has already acknowledged, it 
will be discarded as a duplicate and SSL will never receive it. The result of such 
an attack of a single tampered packet is that the connection will be broken. IPSec, 
however, is not vulnerable to this form of active attack, because IPSec will be 
able to recognize and discard invalid packets and TCP will only receive valid data 
(Ibid).
The fact that IPSec is a technically superior solution than SSL, there exists 
the problem that SSL was widely deployed much earlier (because it does not 
depend on kernel changes). IPSec emerged late from the standards process. 
Therefore, IPSec may simply not be used in situations where it is more 
appropriate, because SSL is considered sufficient and technici are familiar with 
the implementation of SSL (Ibid).
Networks before IPSec were forced to deploy partial solutions which 
addressed only a portion of the problem. For example, SSL provides application 
encryption for Web browsers and other applications. It protects the confidentiality 
of data sent from each application that uses it, but does not protect data sent from 
other applications. Every system and application must be protected with SSL for 
it to work efficiently (Cisco, 2000).
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7.4 Conclusion
It is important to secure information when conducting business. It is 
generally known and understood that when implementing security mechanisms, it 
is, typically, at the cost of performance. The kind of algorithms implemented 
determines how the performance is affected. It is tested that 70% of the duration 
of a transaction comprises asymmetric cryptography, symmetric cryptography and 
hash functions (Zhao, Iyer, Makineni, & Bhuyan, 2003).
The affect on performance posses the question: Is it necessary to secure 
both the pathway and the message content? Simply put: The securing of the 
message contents using WS-Security enables the upper layer applications to 
authenticate and validate the contents of messages and perform audit operations. 
The securing of the pathway ensures that the two trading partners are sure that 
they are communicating with each other through a secure communication tunnel. 
Messages received from illegitimate users are discarded before they reach the 
upper layer application for processing. The message that is received at the Web 
server is no longer protected by the transport security protocol and other security
protocols need to be implemented to ensure security within the message, such as 
WS-Security.
The two transport security protocols of choice, discussed in this chapter, 
are IPSec and SSL/TLS.
The two transport security protocols, SSL/TLS and IPSec have been 
discussed with regard to their pros and cons. Both cater for basic security needs 
such as authentication, integrity, confidentiality and non-repudiation. IPSec and 
SSL/TLS each have their benefits, but which one is the more logical one to 
implement?
Previously SSL/TLS was unable to use the 256-AES algorithm. The 
algorithm has been added to the SSL/TLS suite (Yocom, 2004), which makes its 
encryption as strong as IPSec. There are no known successful attacks on the 256-
AES cipher. As both use the same encryption algorithms, it seems logical that 
SSL/TLS will likely become the protocol of choice, because most companies with 
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existing Web servers already have SSL/TLS implemented. IPSec is very costly to 
implement and the necessary expertise is required. SSL is easier and cheaper to 
implement. Most technici are familiar with the implementation and workings of 
SSL/TLS. It is important that SSL/TLS use the 256-AES algorithm and nothing 
less secure. A mechanism needs to be in place on the Web server ensuring that the
necessary security services with the correct settings are running to protect the 
pathway. Two-way authentication within the SSL/TLS protocol needs to be done 
by using X.509 certificates.
It would be probably be more beneficial for a company to implement 
IPSec within its own network to ensure maximum security. This ensures that data 
sent from the Web server to the rest of the private network is secured, even if an 
employee is connecting from outside the network.
In the next chapter, the proposed framework is discussed, which employs 
all the different protocols and technologies covered by previous chapters.
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Part III
Solution
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Chapter 8
A Messaging Framework
The Web and related technologies comprise a powerful, important, 
competitive and strategic business tool. The need for communication between
different systems and devices is becoming greater with the demand for 
instantaneous access to business data and mobility. However, problems like
interoperability surface when trying to communicate with different entities. This 
is because business systems can occur on different platforms (e.g. Windows,
Linux, Apple, etc.); use different communication, security, etc. protocols, or the 
main business applications are different.
Many standards have been developed to promote interoperability, but
these are generally “flexible”. This flexibility allows different implementation 
options for messaging, which jeopardize interoperability. Therefore, in this 
research study, a Global Message Handler Service framework is proposed to 
promote interoperability in an electronic marketplace, based on set of protocols 
and implementation preferences.
Communication between different systems takes place by sending data in
one or other format to each other. A universal language is needed if all the parties 
want to understand each other.
8.1 A Universal Language
Previously, electronic business document exchange was limited to 
proprietary or loosely-defined document formats. HTML offered enterprises a 
standard format for the exchange and publishing of data. However, in terms of 
data, it is not a flexible design and does not support all the data types of an 
enterprise. A more accepted and flexible standard was developed, namely XML. 
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XML allows the definition of markup tags that suit specific tasks, such as 
electronic commerce, supply-chain integration, data management and publishing 
(Morgenthal, 2004).
XML is a self-describing, semi-structured data model. It is accepted as the 
universal format for data exchange between applications, especially with the 
emergence of Web Services as a standard means of accessing and publishing data 
on the Internet (Milo, Abiteboul, Amann, Benjelloun, & Ngoc, 2003). The 
properties of XML markup make it suitable for representing data, concepts, and 
contexts in an open manner which is platform-, vendor-, and language-neutral; it 
is quickly becoming a strategic tool for defining corporate data over different 
application domains (Morgenthal, 2004).
XML is recommended by the W3C as a standard for communication and 
data transportation in a prescribed format. XML delivers the interoperability of 
data across applications and hardware (Morgenthal, 2004). However, 
interoperability can only be achieved when document formats are standardized. 
For example: when business A sends business B an order invoice, business B 
must be able to process the document and understand its elements to achieve 
interoperability. Standardized business documents are outside the scope of this 
study, which focuses on a standardized messaging mechanism.
The mechanism is needed to send the business information based on the 
universal markup language (XML), which is understood by many systems without 
regard for platforms, proprietary systems or programming language.
8.2 The Vehicle Depot
The Web is a relative inexpensive communication solution for businesses.
More advanced Web mechanisms are required as the content requested over the 
Web becomes more dynamic. Web services have become the de facto standard for 
SOA in e-business and e-commerce systems. They can be seen as a new breed of 
Web applications which are self-contained, self-describing and modular and can 
be published, located and invoked across the Web (Tidwell, 2001).
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A Message Handler Web service can be viewed as a vehicle depot that 
sends out vehicles (data messages) to deliver or to collect goods (data) at other 
depots. It can be customized to only allow authenticated vehicles to deliver or 
collect goods; and it can provide audit trails for subsequent analyses. Using a 
Global Message Handler Service (Web service) allows for universal 
standardization of the service (the protocol set and operation-mechanism).
A Web service uses XML messages to communicate with other Web 
services. These XML messages are formatted according the SOAP specification. 
These SOAP messages, based on XML, are understood by other Web services. 
The SOAP messages are the vehicles transporting the data between the Message 
Handler Web services (vehicle depots). Other Web services will process the 
cargo, as required by mutual agreement between the sender and receiver. This 
processing requires standardized documents and standardized applications; both 
of these are beyond the scope of this research.
Next, it will be examined how Web services can be used to facilitate the 
realization of a globally-interoperable messaging environment; a network of 
regulated vehicle depots, subscribing to the same set of open standards. 
8.3 Proposed Messaging Framework
A global messaging environment is proposed within the suggested 
framework. Within this environment, the Global Message Handler Service 
(GMHS) handles all the business documents being sent from one company to 
another, ensuring they are properly secured using standardized protocols which 
promote interoperability.
Figure 20 illustrates a basic WSDL document describing the Web service
used in the proposed GMHS framework that will handle the messaging. This
WSDL document is incomplete and merely provides guidelines for what is 
required.
93
001 <?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
002 <definitions name="GMHS"
003    targetNamespace="http://tempuri.org/wsdl"
004    xmlns:wsdlns="http://tempuri.org/wsdl"
005    xmlns:typens="http://tempuri.org/xsd"
006    xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"
007    xmlns:soap="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/wsdl/soap/"
008    xmlns:stk="http://schemas.microsoft.com/soap-toolkit/wsdl-extension"
009    xmlns="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/wsdl">
010 
011 <types>
012 <schema targetNamespace-="http://tempuri.org/xsd"
013    xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"
014    xmlns:SOAP-ENC="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/encoding/"
015    xmlns:wsdl="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/wsdl/"
016    elementFormDefault="qualified" >
017 </schema>
018 </types>
019 
020 <message name="messaging.GMHSReceive">
021    <part name="document" type="base64Binary" />
022 </message>
023 
024 <portType name="messagingPortType">
025    <operation name="GMHSReceive" parameterOrder="document">
026       <input message="wsdlns:messaging.GMHSReceive" />
027    </operation>
028 </portType>
029 
030 <binding name="messagingBinding" type=wsdln:messagingPortType">
031    <stk:binding preferredEncoding="UTF-8" />
032    <soap:binding style="rpc" transport='http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/http" />
033    <operation name="GMHSReceive">
034       <soap:operation 
                        soapAction="http://www.companyA.com/action/messaging.GMHSReceive" />
035       <input>
036          <soap:body use="encoded' namespace="http://tempuri.org/message/" 
037                encodingStyle="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/encoding/" />
038       </input>
039    </operation>
040 </binding>
041 
042 <service name="GMHSService">
043    <port name='messagingPort" binding="wsdlns:messagingBinding">
044       <soap:address location="http://www.companyA.com/GMHS/gmhs.asp" />
045    </port>
046 </service>
047
048 </definition>
Figure 20: WSDL Document used in proposed framework
A discussion of the WSDL document in Figure 20 follows below:
 Lines 002 - 018 declare namespaces within the WSDL document, 
which prevent naming conflicts;
 Lines 020 - 022 define the parameter that is sent to the function of
the Web service. This parameter is of type Base64-binary, which is
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a serialized XML document in the proposed framework. This is the 
actual business document being sent from one company to another;
 Lines 024 - 028 define the PortType. A PortType defines a number 
of operations in the abstract (Tapang, 2001). Operation elements 
within the PortType define the syntax for calling all methods in the 
PortType. Each operation element declares the name of the 
method, the parameters and the type of the parameters;
 Lines 030 - 040, the binding elements, specify the protocol, 
serialization and encoding on the wire. All the elements before the 
binding element are focused on the data content of the abstract 
whereas the binding section focuses on the physical details of data 
transmission;
 In line 032 the standardized transport protocol of choice will be 
http.
 Lines 042 - 046, the service element, are a set of port elements. 
Each port element associates a location with a binding in a one-to-
one style. Should there be more than one port element associated 
with the same binding, the additional URL locations are used as 
alternatives;
Figure 21: General view of GMHS
The WSDL document above is intended to provide some perspective on 
the proposed GMHS. Next, the discussion will continue on a more abstract level. 
Figure 21 illustrates two companies that are connected to the Internet. The 
following conditions/situation apply: On each of the Web servers of the two 
companies is an instance of the GMHS Web service. When a request is sent from 
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the one company to the other, the GMHS processes the request, which is 
contained within a secure SOAP envelope, and forwards the information 
contained in the received message to the backend systems for processing.
Figure 22 illustrates two GMHSs which are communicating with each 
other. The GMHS is connected to a database that logs records of messaging. An 
interface is connected to the GMHS which is used for administration purposes, 
such as retrieving reports from the database and configuring the GMHS. Other 
Web services are connected to the GMHS, representing business processes that 
will process the XML documents received by the GMHS.
Figure 22: General operation of GMHS
In the next two sections the sending and receiving of messages, using the 
proposed framework, will be discussed.
8.3.1 Sending of a Message
Company A wishes to send a business document to Company B. Both 
companies have a GMHS in place, which facilitates standardized messaging 
between the two. The choreography of the messaging, the documents (and data) 
and business processes/flows are superfluous to the operation of the GMHS. 
Company A creates the business document which is processed by an endpoint of 
Company B. Company A must request a WSDL document from Company B 
96
which describes the endpoint function for whom the business document is 
intended, to ensure that a valid document will be sent to Company B. Once a valid 
XML business document is created by Company A, it can be sent to Company B. 
A user from Company A will serialize the business document into Base64-
encoding and send it, using the GMHS address of the destination, to GMHS of 
Company A (GMHS-A, a local Web service).
GMHS-A accepts the document and the URL. The method of sending the 
document and destination URL to the GMHS is undefined by this dissertation; it
is open to implementation preference. Once the document is received by GMHS-
A, the latter packages the document as an XOP-MTOM package, adds the 
addressing information and applies the necessary security measures. In essence, 
the business document is the payload of a secured SOAP envelope.
GMHS-A invokes the Receive Web method of GMHS-B. GMHS-A 
communicates with GMHS-B to create a reliable delivery sequence. Once the 
sequence is established, GMHS-A creates a basic SOAP message. The serialized 
business document is placed within the body of this SOAP message. GMHS-A 
places the necessary addressing information within the SOAP header. Next, the 
reliable delivery sequencing information is placed within the SOAP header. The 
message is able to be routed in a reliable manner to GMHS-B with all this 
information added to the message. However, no security has yet been added to the 
message. Security needs to be added to all the reliable delivery messages sent 
between the GMHSs. GMHS-A must encrypt all the messages and digitally sign 
them for integrity purposes, using WS-Security (with XML Encryption and XML 
DIGSIG, as discussed earlier). The message can then be optimized using the 
guidelines specified in the MTOM specification.
Once the message is secure, it is sent from GMHS-A to GMHS-B. 
GMHS-B responds with an acknowledgement. It is important that this 
acknowledgement is digitally signed and logged at GMHS-A. This ensures that 
Company B cannot deny receipt of the specific message.
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The communication is terminated after the acknowledgement is received.
The reliable delivery sequence is stopped and indicates the end of the 
communication.
8.3.2 Receiving of a Message
The GMHS of Company B receives the message sent by Company A. 
After GMHS-B has received the message and the reliable delivery sequence
terminated, it must process the received message. GMHS-B removes the
optimization features and reconstructs the message. It verifies the signed message 
and checks for any tampering. Should the integrity of the message be 
uncompromised, it decrypts the message and extracts the actual business 
document from the SOAP body. The document is de-serialized from Base64-
binary into a normal XML document. The document is in the clear. GMHS-B 
examines it and determines to which endpoint function it needs to send the 
document. GMHS-B searches for the specified action within the document. Once 
the action is located, it sends the document to the specific endpoint for processing.
The specified endpoint function returns a response using the details
(addressing, message identifiers, etc.) specified within the received document 
after successful or failed processing. GMHS-B will follow the same steps as 
discussed in Section 8.3.1 to send the response to Company A.
All SOAP messages sent and received are saved for non-repudiation 
(auditing) purposes within the GMHS database. These saved messages can also be
used to identify replay-attacks. It is important that all messages travel through the 
GMHS to ensure secure communication. The next chapter focuses on the actual 
messages being sent between the GMHS and the proposed protocols-of-choice.
The communication described above assumes HTTP-binding. The
pathway needs to be secured, since the messages will travel via the Web, which is 
an insecure transport medium.
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8.4 Securing the Pathway
The pathway is the data link between the Web servers of Company A and
Company B, which host the GMHSs. All communications between the two
GMHSs take place over this link.
The two VPN protocols, IPSec and SSL/TLS, were researched in this
study with a view to securing the GMHS-GMHS pathway. A secure VPN is a 
method of providing entities with secure access to network resources through a 
combination of tunneling, encryption, authentication, access controls, auditing, 
and services used to transport traffic over a TCP/IP protocol based network, such 
as the Internet. As discussed earlier, a VPN supports transactions over the 
Internet, making it more cost-effective by tying business partners and suppliers 
together and reducing multiple communication links and legacy equipment 
(Younglove, 2000). The global network of GMHSs therefore works like an 
extended extranet. The exact location of the GMHS Web service – whether it 
should be local to each Web server or be provided by some third-party (Grid) 
service provider – is a matter for further debate.
IPSec is flexible, but complicated to implement. Deployment is labour
intensive, expensive and experts might be needed. SSL/TLS is flexible enough to 
fit a range of security needs. It is available through most Web browsers and many
user devices. SSL/TLS is scalable and quick to deploy (OpenBSD, 2003).
It is a fact that IPSec is a technically superior solution to SSL/TLS.
However, SSL/TLS was widely deployed much earlier, is considered efficient 
enough and the technici are familiar with it (Perlman & Kaufman, 2000).
Most Web servers have SSL/TLS already implemented and is able to use 
the 256-AES algorithm (Yocom, 2004).
SSL/TLS is thus VPN protocol of choice to be used within the proposed 
messaging framework. It is recommended that nothing less than the 256-AES 
encryption be used. It is important that the connection must be verified in some 
way to determine that the necessary security is enabled. Two-way authentication 
is important, using X.509 certificates, to ensure that both endpoints are 
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authenticated. This will prevent malicious entities from sending unauthenticated 
messages to the GMHS.
8.5 Conclusion
The above discussion on how the Global Message Handler Service 
functions is at a high-level. It is obvious that there is great need for appropriate, 
interoperable security. The pathway can be secured using the SSL/TLS protocol 
with a minimum of 256-AES encryption. However, although the pathway may be 
secure other areas need attention. The information collected at the SSL server is 
not secured by the SSL connection. SSL protects only the link (RSA Security, 
2004).
Another problem arises in that SSL/TLS establishes a connection 
according to the strongest supported encryption algorithm by the weaker entity. 
Another method must exist to secure the actual business documents being sent 
between the GMHSs, in case the VPN security is insufficient.
How can the message be simultaneously authenticated, validated, kept 
confidential and have its integrity assured? Many standards are available that 
enhance SOAP message security. The security of the XML message will be 
discussed in the next chapter.
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Chapter 9
A Message Framework (The Vehicle)
It was argued in the previous chapter that Web services are the best means
to facilitate messaging within the proposed framework. Web services 
communicate with other Web services and Web services clients using SOAP 
messages. The anticipated ubiquity of SOAP messages – as discussed in previous 
chapters – stems from SOAP being based on XML and using common Internet 
transport protocols such as HTTP to carry the data (Sleeper & Robins, 2004).
9.1 The Vehicle Chassis
A SOAP message is essentially a one-way transmission between SOAP 
nodes. SOAP messages can be used in a more complex manner such as in 
interaction patterns ranging from a single request/response to multiple two-way 
conversations (Mitra, 2003).
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<env:Envelope xmlns:env="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/">
   <env:Header>
   </env:Header>
   <env:Body>
   </env:Body>
</env:Envelope>
Figure 23: A basic SOAP Message
A SOAP message contains two SOAP-specific sub-elements within the
overall Envelope element, namely the Header and the Body elements. Figure 23
depicts an example of a SOAP message.
The SOAP <Body> element is where the “cargo” will be loaded. The 
SOAP messages passed between the GMHSs carry business documents or system
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information messages, e.g. delivery reports, etc. Figure 24 is an example of a 
document that is sent from Company A to Company B.
<env:Envelope          
     xmlns:env="http://www.w3.org/2002/12/soap-envelope"
     xmlns:wsa="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2004/08/addressing"
     xmlns:data="http://www.musicworld.com/data">
  <env:Header>
     <wsa:MessageID>http://www.companyA.com/0baaf8gd-3f3b-4ecf-a6d8-               
                 a7c2eb546ae5</wsa:MessageID>
      <wsa:From>
         <wsa:Address>http://www.companyA.com/SendOrder</wsa:Address>
      </wsa:From>
      <wsa:ReplyTo>
         <wsa:Address>http://www.companyA.com/SendOrderResponse</wsa:Address>
      </wsa:ReplyTo>
      <wsa:FaultTo>
         <wsa:Address>http://www.companyA.com/SendOrderFault</wsa:Address>
      </wsa:FaultTo>
      <wsa:To env:mustUnderstand="1">http://www.companyB.com/ReceiveOrder</wsa:To>
      <wsa:Action>http://www.companyB.com/ReceiveOrder/receiveorder.asp</wsa:Action>
   </env:Header>
   <env:Body>
      <data:order>
         <data:item id="1">
            <data:barcode>1234567</data:stockid>
            <data:album>Greatest Hits</data:album>
            <data:artist>Tracy Chapman</data:artist>
            <data:quantity>6</data:quantity>
            <data:price currency="ZAR">99.95</data:price>
         </data:item>
      </data:order>
   </env:body>
</env:Envelope>
Figure 24: An example of a business document
The document is placed within GMHS message. The document is 
converted to Base64-encoding before placing it within the Body element of the 
GMHS custom message. The two messages are thus, for all intents and purposes, 
separate ones. Base64-encoding allows for the optimization of a message as 
specified within the MTOM specification. The GMHS messages will then look 
similar to Figure 25.
The age of a business document needs to be determined when received. It 
might happen that a message has been delayed and been re-sent. The addition of a 
time and date to a message can prevent the double processing of a specific 
message.
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<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<env:Envelope xmlns:env="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/">
   <env:Header>
   </env:Header>
   <env:Body >
      <document>
            ZXCVASASDF234JHKKE...
      </document>
   </env:Body>
</env:Envelope>
Figure 25: The GMHS message containing a business document
9.2 Race Against the Clock
Timestamp elements are added to a message to guarantee its freshness. 
The timestamp indicates when the message was created, when it expires, etc. It 
needs to be digitally signed to ensure integrity. A timestamp with a unique 
message ID uniquely identifies a message. If the same message is received again, 
it must be rejected. All timestamps must be in the UTC format. Figure 26
illustrates a timestamp insertion.
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<env:Envelope xmlns:env="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/"
         xmlns:wsse="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2002/07/secext"
         xmlns:wsu="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-utility-
         1.0.xsd>
   <env:Header>
      <wsse:Security soap:mustUnderstand="1">
         <wsu:Timestamp wsu:Id="Time">
            <wsu:Created>2005-07-08T10:35:23Z</wsu:Created>
            <wsu:Expires>2005-07-08T11:35:23Z</wsu:Expires>
         </wsu:Timestamp>
      </wsse:Security>
   </env:Header>
   <env:Body >
      <document>
            ZXCVASASDF234JHKKE...
      </document>
   </env:Body>
</env:Envelope>
Figure 26: GMHS with a timestamp
The cargo is also loaded with an associated timestamp to ensure its 
freshness. In the next section, the mechanism for how the vehicle must be directed 
(to where its cargo must be delivered) will be discussed.
103
9.3 Directing the Vehicle
The Web Service Addressing (WS-Addressing) specification promotes 
addressing methods which ensure interoperability. This specification defines two 
interoperable constructs that provide information typically supplied by transport 
protocols and messaging systems. These constructs normalize the underlying 
transport information into a uniform format that is processed independent of 
transport or application. The constructs are referred to as: endpoint reference and 
message information headers (Box et al., 2004).
Endpoint referencing is as an URL wrapped by some XML elements.
Message information headers collectively enhance a message with standard
defined properties. These properties enable the identification and location of the 
endpoints involved in an interaction (Ibid).
The request and reply pattern is a very common interaction pattern to be
used within the proposed GMHS. It consists of an initial message (request) sent 
from the sender and the receiver sends a reply message back which is an 
application message, a fault or any other message. These messages are only 
applicable to the GMHS and do not necessarily reflect the message exchange
pattern of the endpoint function processing a received business document.
The information contained within the message information header is 
unchangeable and is not supposed to be modified along the message path.
The construct of choice within the GMHS is the Message Information
Header construct. Different endpoints can be specified using this construct, to
cater for processing among different endpoints. A Message ID is associated with a 
specific message which is important for auditing purposes. It is important to note 
that some Message Information Header elements use the endpoint reference 
construct. The application creating the business documents assigns its own unique 
IDs to the business documents and the GMHS assigns its own unique message 
IDs to messages being sent between two communicating GMHSs.
Figure 27 depicts the GMHS message after the addressing information is 
added. The message contains the following:
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 A unique message ID which is used to identify the message;
 Included addresses specifying the sender;
 Specification of the receiver;
 Specification of the destination address for a response message or a 
fault message.
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<env:Envelope xmlns:env="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/"
         xmlns:wsse="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2002/07/secext"
         xmlns:wsu="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-utility-
         1.0.xsd"  xmlns:wsa="hhtp://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2004/08/addressing">
   <env:Header>
      <wsse:Security soap:mustUnderstand="1">
        <wsu:Timestamp wsu:Id="Time">
            <wsu:Created>2005-07-08T10:35:23Z</wsu:Created>
            <wsu:Expires>2005-07-08T11:35:23Z</wsu:Expires>
         </wsu:Timestamp>
      </wsse:Security>
      <wsa:MessageID>msgid123</wsa:MessageID>
      <wsa:From>
         <wsa:Address>http://www.companyA.com/GMHS</wsa:Address>
      </wsa:From>
      <wsa:ReplyTo>
         <wsa:Address>http://www.companyA.com/GMHS</wsa:Address>
      </wsa:ReplyTo>
      <wsa:FaultTo>
         <wsa:Address>http://www.companyA.com/GMHS</wsa:Address>
      </wsa:FaultTo>
      <wsa:To env:mustUnderstand="1">http://www.companyB.com/GMHS</wsa:To>
      <wsa:Action>http://www.companyB.com/GMHS/gmhs.asp</wsa:Action>
   </env:Header>
   <env:Body >
      <document>
            ZXCVASASDF234JHKKE...
      </document>
   </env:Body>
</env:Envelope>
Figure 27: The GMHS message containing the addressing information
Asynchronous messaging is enabled using this mode of addressing with 
WS-Addressing. Typically, messages would be queued until the destination 
GMHS become available; or, after a specified time period, a fault message is sent 
to the endpoint function from where the message was sent, to indicate a delivery 
failure.
A GMHS which expects to get flooded with messages can specify 
different endpoints within the <ReplyTo> or <FaultTo> elements. All response
messages and fault messages can be directed to a different Web server which
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processes those messages. This lightens the burden on the main Web server
running the GMHS instance.
At this stage, the vehicle possesses the necessary addressing information
and a unique identifier ensuring it can be routed to the correct destination. The 
next step is to ensure that the message delivery is guaranteed.
9.4 Ensuring Reliable Delivery
The Web Services Reliable Messaging Protocol (WS-Reliability) has been 
established to ensure an interoperable reliable messaging protocol, independent of 
the transport protocol. Four basic delivery assurances are defined by this 
specification. One example is the ExactlyOnce option. This ensures that every 
message sent is delivered without duplication or an error will be raised by at least 
one endpoint.
Assume Company A wants to send a business document to Company B. A 
reliable sequence needs to be created to start the reliable messaging. The GMHS 
of Company A will send a message to the GMHS of Company B to establish a 
sequence. 
All related messages will be sent using the same groupId with different 
sequence numbers. A sequence will be terminated as specified within the WS-
Reliability specification.
When a message is received indicating that it is the last message or a poll 
message requesting acknowledgement of delivery, then a Response message must 
be sent indicating the sequence numbers of the received messages.
The WS-ReliableMessaging specification (Ferris, et al, 2005) is 
considered (in this dissertation) to be an easier implementation option than the 
WS-Reliability (Iwasa, et al, 2004) specification. However, the WS-
ReliableMessaging specification has not yet been accepted as a standard. This 
specification was discussed earlier and would be used in its basic form.
The focus of this discussion will now change to message security.
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9.5 Adding Security Features
As mentioned in earlier chapters, it is important that the message is signed 
to ensure its integrity and to cater for non-repudiation purposes (Box et al., 2004).
It is recommended that the message body and all relevant headers are included 
within the signature, to bind them together. This prevents any spoofing by 
intermediaries. Addressing information is encrypted for end-to-end privacy, but it 
is important to remember that intermediaries need to access required information 
such as the <To> element to be able to route the message (Ibid).
The <MessageID> element is used to ensure the uniqueness of a message,
to detect possible replays of a message. It is recommended to use a timestamp 
combined with the message identifier to guarantee a unique identifier (Ibid).
The <Sequence> header needs to be included with the body in the 
signature to bind them together. This will prevent intermediaries from changing
the Sequence information (Ferris et al., 2005).
The combination of XML Digital Signatures and XML Encryption can
provide most of the required security. The WS-Security protocol is based on these
two standards.
9.5.1 Encryption
In the proposed model, SOAP and XML messages can compromise 
information about the internal workings of a Web service and not just the data it 
carries. The data and the message structure can be fully protected when an 
appropriate encryption algorithm is used (Gailey, 2003).
The WS-Security protocol specifies the XML Encryption protocol to 
encrypt data. As discussed earlier, XML Encryption allows the whole message to 
be encrypted or just parts thereof. XML Encryption also allows for any encryption 
algorithm to be used. Certain algorithms are recommended by the XML 
Encryption specification for certain uses (Eastlake & Reagle, 2002).
The AES-256 block encryption is recommended for securing the data 
within the message. The RSA-OAEP key encryption algorithm is the choice for
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encrypting the symmetric key, using an X.509 certificate (which is scalable for 
Internet purposes), because it can transport 256-bit keys whereas the RSA-v1.5 is 
suitable for DES which is replaced by AES.
All addressing headers, including the <To> element, and the <body> 
element need to be encrypted. The contents of the <body> element need to be
encrypted. This ensures that the message content is un-readable by unauthorized 
entities. The reason for the <To> element remaining unencrypted is simply that 
intermediaries can see where to send the message, without any additional 
processing of the message. The intermediaries are unable to see any further details
of the message.
Digitally signing the message ensures integrity, authorization and non-
repudiation.
Figure 28 illustrates the message, after the business document within the 
body of the message has been encrypted.
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<env:Envelope xmlns:env="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/"
         xmlns:wsa="hhtp://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2004/08/addressing"
         xmlns:wsrm="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/02/rm"
         xmlns:wsse="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2002/07/secext"
         xmlns:wsu="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-utility-
        1.0.xsd" xmlns:xenc="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#">
   <env:Header>
      <wsse:Security soap:mustUnderstand="1">
         <wsu:Timestamp wsu:Id="Time">
            <wsu:Created>2005-07-08T10:35:23Z</wsu:Created>
            <wsu:Expires>2005-07-08T11:35:23Z</wsu:Expires>
         </wsu:Timestamp>
         <wsse:BinarySecurityToken ValueType="wsse:X509v3" wsu:Id="X509Token" 
              EncodingType="wsse:Base64Binary">
            MJIJnh7987JHJg77HGBghhj.....
         </wsse:BinarySecurityToken>
         <xenc:EncryptedKey Type="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#EncryptedKey">
            <xenc:EncryptionMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#rsa-oaep-mgf1p" 
/>
            <KeyInfo xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#">
               <wsse:SecurityTokenReference>
                  <wsse:Reference URI="#X509Token" />
               </wsse:SecurityTokenReference>
            </KeyInfo>
            <xenc:CipherData>
              <xenc:CipherValue>Hju5653bhbHBGG34GhhdDDHG.....</xenc:CipherValue>
            </xenc:CipherData>
            <xenc:ReferenceList>
              <xenc:DataReference URI="#Encrypted-addresses" />
              <xenc:DataReference URI="#Encrypted-body" />
           </xenc:ReferenceList>
         </xenc:EncryptedKey>
      </wsse:Security>
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      <wsa:To env:mustUnderstand="1">http://www.companyB.com/GMHS</wsa:To>
      <wsa:Action>http://www.companyB.com/GMHS/gmhs.asp</wsa:Action>
      <xenc:EncryptedData Id="Encrypted-addresses" 
          Type="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#Content">
         <xenc:EncryptionMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#aes256-cbc" />
         <xenc:CipherData>
            <xenc:CipherValue>
               jkhhhuhifuuuHGFGFG78887asdfFGFASD8234........
            </xenc:CipherValue>
         </xenc:CipherData>
      </xenc:EncryptedData>
   </env:Header>
   <env:Body>
      <xenc:EncryptedData Id="Encrypted-body" Type="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#Content" 
              xmlns:xenc="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#">
         <xenc:EncryptionMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#aes256-cbc" />
         <xenc:CipherData>
            <xenc:CipherValue>
               hjJHKJH98984q3ghGA9gasadfUFDAS........
            </xenc:CipherValue>
         </xenc:CipherData>
      </xenc:EncryptedData>
   </env:Body>
</env:Envelope>
Figure 28: An Encrypted message using XML Encryption
9.5.2 Signing the Message
XML Signatures are applicable to any digital content and XML. It is a
method of associating a key with referenced data (Eastlake, Reagle, & Solo,
2002). A signature can verify both the integrity of a message and the sender of the
message. It provides a form of authentication, because only the corresponding key 
can decrypt encrypted information.
The XML Signature and Encryption specifications allow any algorithm to
be used; there are certain algorithms required or recommended for specific
actions. As argued earlier, the possible permutations of implementations can be 
enormous in allowing all these different algorithms. Different implementations 
would have difficulty in communicating with each other and interoperability 
would be compromised (on a wider scale). A set of pre-defined GMHS protocols, 
standards, algorithms, etc, is essential.
The SHA-512 algorithm is, therefore, recommended to be used as the
message digest algorithm for GMHS interaction. The SHA-1 algorithm is said to 
be prone to certain vulnerabilities and stronger algorithms are recommended 
(NIST, 2004).
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Since public key cryptography is going to be used within the proposed
framework, it is not necessary to use a MAC algorithm. The signature algorithm 
recommended is RSA with SHA1. This algorithm is recommended by the XML 
Digital Signature specification, instead of the DSA with SHA1 algorithm
(Eastlake et al., 2002).
Data to be signed must first be canonicalized before signing can take
place. The canonicalization algorithm of choice is the Exclusive XML 
Canonicalization algorithm, as specified by the WS-Security standard. This is due
to security concerns with namespaces.
Further, the timestamp which indicates when a message was created, when 
it expires, etc. needs to be digitally signed to prevent replay attacks.
An X.509 digital certificate should be used when signing the message. It is 
important that a standard mechanism is in place to validate digital certificates. 
This is beyond the scope of this dissertation.
Figure 29 illustrates the signed message. The digital certificate, timestamp, 
encrypted addressing elements and the encrypted document in the body are 
digitally signed. The signing of all these elements together ensures that an 
adversary cannot alter or forge any of these signed elements.
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<env:Envelope xmlns:env="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/"
         xmlns:wsa="hhtp://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2004/08/addressing"
         xmlns:wsrm="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/02/rm"
         xmlns:wsu="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-utility-
         1.0.xsd" xmlns:xenc="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#"
         xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#">
   <env:Header>
      <wsse:Security soap:mustUnderstand="1" 
              xmlns:wsse="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2002/07/secext">
         <wsu:Timestamp wsu:Id="Time">
            <wsu:Created>2005-07-08T10:35:23Z</wsu:Created>
            <wsu:Expires>2005-07-08T11:35:23Z</wsu:Expires>
         </wsu:Timestamp>
         <wsse:BinarySecurityToken ValueType="wsse:X509v3" wsu:Id="X509Token" 
              EncodingType="wsse:Base64Binary">
            MJIJnh7987JHJg77HGBghhj.....
         </wsse:BinarySecurityToken>
         <ds:Signature>
            <ds:SignedInfo>
               <ds:CanonicalizationMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#" />
               <ds:SignatureMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#rsa-sha1" />
               <ds:Reference URI="X509Token">
                  <ds:Transforms>
                     <ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#" />
                  </ds:Transforms>
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                  <ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#sha512 " />
                  <ds:DigestValue>JkSD556DDksd834asdfgf8asdf....</ds:DigestValue>
               </ds:Reference>
               <ds:Reference URI="Time">
                  <ds:Transforms>
                     <ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#" />
                  </ds:Transforms>
                  <ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#sha512 " />
                  <ds:DigestValue>JkJIksd834jasdf8asdf....</ds:DigestValue>
               </ds:Reference>
               <ds:Reference URI="Encrypted-addresses">
                  <ds:Transforms>
                     <ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#" />
                  </ds:Transforms>
                  <ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#sha512 " />
                  <ds:DigestValue>HjkasdHFG77ASd89asdfFD....</ds:DigestValue>
               </ds:Reference>
               <ds:Reference URI="Encrypted-body">
                  <ds:Transforms>
                     <ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#" />
                  </ds:Transforms>
                    <ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#sha512 " />
                  <ds:DigestValue>kuweUHA34AG45JHAbh334h....</ds:DigestValue>
               </ds:Reference>
            </ds:SignedInfo>
            <ds:SignatureValue>HJha787asdfFHBS632HASgg33....</ds:SignatureValue>
            <ds:KeyInfo>
               <wsse:SecurityTokenReference>
                  <wsse:Reference URI="X509Token" />
               </wsse:SecurityTokenReference>
            </ds:KeyInfo>
         </ds:Signature>
         <xenc:EncryptedKey Type="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#EncryptedKey">
            <xenc:EncryptionMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#rsa-oaep-mgf1p" 
/>
            <KeyInfo xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#">
               <wsse:SecurityTokenReference>
                  <wsse:Reference URI="#X509Token" />
               </wsse:SecurityTokenReference>
            </KeyInfo>
            <xenc:CipherData>
              <xenc:CipherValue>Hju5653bhbHBGG34GhhdDDHG.....</xenc:CipherValue>
            </xenc:CipherData>
            <xenc:ReferenceList>
              <xenc:DataReference URI="#Encrypted-addresses" />
              <xenc:DataReference URI="#Encrypted-body" />
           </xenc:ReferenceList>
         </xenc:EncryptedKey>
      </wsse:Security>
      <wsa:To env:mustUnderstand="1">http://www.companyB.com/GMHS</wsa:To>
      <wsa:Action>http://www.companyB.com/GMHS/Receive</wsa:Action>
      <xenc:EncryptedData Id="Encrypted-addresses" 
            Type="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#Content" 
              xmlns:xenc="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#">
         <xenc:EncryptionMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#aes256-cbc" />
         <xenc:CipherData>
            <xenc:CipherValue>
               jkhhhuhifuuuHGFGFG78887asdfFGFASD8234........
            </xenc:CipherValue>
         </xenc:CipherData>
      </xenc:EncryptedData>
   </env:Header>
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   <env:Body>
      <xenc:EncryptedData Id="Encrypted-body" Type="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#Content" 
              xmlns:xenc="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#">
         <xenc:EncryptionMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#aes256-cbc" />
         <xenc:CipherData>
            <xenc:CipherValue>
               hjJHKJH98984q3ghGA9gasadfUFDAS........
            </xenc:CipherValue>
         </xenc:CipherData>
      </xenc:EncryptedData>
   </env:Body>
</env:Envelope>
Figure 29: A Digitally Signed Message
The message is now considered secured. An adversary cannot see what
cargo is loaded onto a vehicle and the vehicle is secure. Some of the cargo can be 
bulky and might strain performance. It is therefore important to optimize the 
message.
9.6 Optimizing the Cargo
Data, such as binary, cannot be placed within an XML message, because
XML is text-based format. Such data (data which cannot represented in XML) 
can be in Base64-encoding. This type of encoding is popular for its seamless 
integration into SOAP envelopes. Base64-encoding has better size-efficiency than 
structured XML and not all data types can be structured in XML format. 
However, Base64-encoding bloats data by 33% and is not as efficient as binary 
which is a very compact format. Message Transmission Optimization Mechanism 
(MTOM) combines Base64-encoding with SOAP with attachments. Base64-
encoded data is streamed as binary data and added as a MIME message parts 
(Powell, 2004).
MTOM uses XML-binary Optimized Packaging (XOP), which is an 
alternate mode of serialization of XML, allowing the expression of an XML 
document as an XOP package. Anything nominated as a Base64 string is encoded 
as an attachment in a XOP package. However, the linking between the data and 
the attachment is different; rather than relying on the application to handle it, the 
format does so itself (Nottingham, 2004).
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All Base64-encoded data are added to the message as MIME attachments.
The performance of a message is increased, with such a specification in place, by 
replacing all the Base64-encoded sections of a message. It is recommended that 
the optimization mechanism be used within the proposed messaging framework.
The HTTP SOAP Transmission Optimization Feature is preferred for its 
composability and transfer efficiency. Figure 30 illustrates an example of an 
optimized message.
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: Multipart/Related;boundary=MIME_boundary;
    type="application/xop+xml";
    start="<mymessage.xml@example.org>";
    startinfo="application/soap+xml; action=\"ProcessData\""
Content-Description: A SOAP message containing business document
--MIME_boundary
Content-Type: application/xop+xml; 
    charset=UTF-8; 
    type="application/soap+xml; action=\"ProcessData\""
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Content-ID: <message.gmhs@companyA.com>
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<env:Envelope xmlns:env="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/"
         xmlns:wsa="hhtp://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2004/08/addressing"
         xmlns:wsrm="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/02/rm"
         xmlns:wsu="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-utility-
         1.0.xsd" xmlns:xenc="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#"
         xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"
         xmlns:xmlmime="http://www.w3.org/2004/11/xmlmime"
         xmlns:xop="http://www.w3.org/2004/08/xop/include">
   <env:Header>
      <wsse:Security soap:mustUnderstand="1" 
                   xmlns:wsse="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2002/07/secext">
         <wsu:Timestamp wsu:Id="Time">
            <wsu:Created>2005-07-08T10:35:23Z</wsu:Created>
            <wsu:Expires>2005-07-08T11:35:23Z</wsu:Expires>
         </wsu:Timestamp>
         <wsse:BinarySecurityToken ValueType="wsse:X509v3" wsu:Id="X509Token" 
              EncodingType="wsse:Base64Binary">
              <xop:Include href="cid:http://companyA.com/x509.tok" />
         </wsse:BinarySecurityToken>
         <ds:Signature>
            <ds:SignedInfo>
               <ds:CanonicalizationMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#" />
               <ds:SignatureMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#rsa-sha1" />
              <ds:Reference URI="X509Token">
                  <ds:Transforms>
                     <ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#" />
                  </ds:Transforms>
                  <ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#sha512 " />
                  <ds:DigestValue>JkSD556DDksd834asdfgf8asdf....</ds:DigestValue>
               </ds:Reference>
               <ds:Reference URI="Time">
                  <ds:Transforms>
                     <ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#" />
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                  </ds:Transforms>
                  <ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#sha512 " />
                  <ds:DigestValue><xop:Include href="cid:http://companyA.com/time.hsh" 
                     /></ds:DigestValue>
               </ds:Reference>
               <ds:Reference URI="Encrypted-addresses">
                  <ds:Transforms>
                     <ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#" />
                  </ds:Transforms>
                  <ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#sha512 " />
                  <ds:DigestValue><xop:include href="cid:http://companyA.com/addresses.hsh" 
                        /></ds:DigestValue>
               </ds:Reference>
               <ds:Reference URI="Encrypted-body">
                  <ds:Transforms>
                     <ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#" />
                  </ds:Transforms>
                  <ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#sha512 " />
                  <ds:DigestValue><xop:include href="cid:http://companyA.com/body.hsh" 
                        /></ds:DigestValue>
               </ds:Reference>
            </ds:SignedInfo>
            <ds:SignatureValue><xop:include href="cid:http://companyA.com/signature.hsh" 
                       /></ds:SignatureValue>
            <ds:KeyInfo>
               <wsse:SecurityTokenReference>
                  <wsse:Reference URI="X509Token" />
               </wsse:SecurityTokenReference>
            </ds:KeyInfo>
         </ds:Signature>
         <xenc:EncryptedKey Type="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#EncryptedKey">
            <xenc:EncryptionMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#rsa-oaep-mgf1p" 
                />
            <KeyInfo xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#">
               <wsse:SecurityTokenReference>
                  <wsse:Reference URI="#X509Token" />
               </wsse:SecurityTokenReference>
            </KeyInfo>
            <xenc:CipherData>
              <xenc:CipherValue><xop:include href="cid:http://companyA.com/enckey.enc" 
                    /></xenc:CipherValue>
            </xenc:CipherData>
            <xenc:ReferenceList>
              <xenc:DataReference URI="#Encrypted-addresses" />
              <xenc:DataReference URI="#Encrypted-body" />
           </xenc:ReferenceList>
         </xenc:EncryptedKey>
      </wsse:Security>
      <wsa:To env:mustUnderstand="1">http://www.companyB.com/GMHS</wsa:To>
      <wsa:Action>http://www.companyB.com/GMHS/Receive</wsa:Action>
      <xenc:EncryptedData Id="Encrypted-addresses" 
           Type="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#Content" 
              xmlns:xenc="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#">
         <xenc:EncryptionMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#aes256-cbc" />
         <xenc:CipherData>
            <xenc:CipherValue>
               <xop:include href="cid:http://companyA.com/encheader.enc" />
            </xenc:CipherValue>
         </xenc:CipherData>
      </xenc:EncryptedData>
   </env:Header>
   <env:Body>
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      <xenc:EncryptedData Id="Encrypted-body" Type="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#Content" 
              xmlns:xenc="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#">
         <xenc:EncryptionMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#aes256-cbc" />
         <xenc:CipherData>
            <xenc:CipherValue>
               <xop:include href="cid:http://companyA.com/encbody.enc" />
            </xenc:CipherValue>
         </xenc:CipherData>
      </xenc:EncryptedData>
   </env:Body>
</env:Envelope>
--MIME_boundary
Content-Type: application/x509
Content-Transfer-Encoding: binary
Content-ID: <http://companyA.com/x509.tok>
// binary octets for x509 certificate
--MIME_boundary--
Content-Type: application/base64
Content-Transfer-Encoding: binary
Content-ID: <http://companyA.com/time.hsh>
// binary octets for digest value
--MIME_boundary--
Content-Type: application/base64
Content-Transfer-Encoding: binary
Content-ID: <http://companyA.com/addresses.hsh>
// binary octets for digest value
--MIME_boundary--
Content-Type: application/base64
Content-Transfer-Encoding: binary
Content-ID: <http://companyA.com/body.hsh>
// binary octets for digest value
--MIME_boundary--
Content-Type: application/pkcs7-signature
Content-Transfer-Encoding: binary
Content-ID: <http://companyA.com/signature.hsh>
// binary octets for signature
--MIME_boundary--
Content-Type: application/base64
Content-Transfer-Encoding: binary
Content-ID: <http://companyA.com/enckey.enc>
// binary octets for cipher value
--MIME_boundary--
Content-Type: application/base64
Content-Transfer-Encoding: binary
Content-ID: <http://companyA.com/encheader.enc>
// binary octets for cipher value
--MIME_boundary--
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Content-Type: application/base64
Content-Transfer-Encoding: binary
Content-ID: <http://companyA.com/encbody.enc>
// binary octets for cipher value
--MIME_boundary--
Figure 30: An optimized message using MTOM
9.7 Conclusion
The WS-ReliableMessaging specification is used in this framework to 
create a reliable delivery message sequence, which ensures that the delivery of a 
message is guaranteed. The use of the WS-Addressing specification allows 
routing of the message, by specifying endpoints for certain processing actions.
XML-Signatures and XML-Encryption are proposed for ensuring the bulk 
of the security requirements, in the framework. XML-Encryption is used to
provide confidentiality, using the AES-256 encryption algorithm. Digital
Signatures are used to ensure the integrity of messages, using SHA-512. 
All security recommendations within this framework are based on state-
of-the-art protocols. X509 certificates are used for authentication, because these
scale well on the Internet.
It is important that good performance is achieved when the message is 
placed within the custom GMHS SOAP-envelope that provides security and 
interoperability. MTOM allows Base64-encoded data to be added as MIME 
attachments to messages in binary format, which are smaller in size.
The use of these specifications discussed in this chapter can create a very
secure, powerful and interoperable messaging environment. This framework is, 
quite obviously, not complete and other specifications, such as WS-
SecureConversation, WS-Trust, etc., could be incorporated to refine it.
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Part IV
Conclusion
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Chapter 10
Conclusion
In the previous two chapters a framework was proposed to cater for secure 
and interoperable messaging in a global electronic marketplace. In this chapter, 
the focus will be on evaluating the proposed GMHS and suggesting future 
developments. 
10.1 An Analytical View of the GMHS
The main object of the proposed framework is to establish a secure and 
interoperable messaging environment based on existing Web technologies and 
standards. The intention was to achieve interoperability and security (including 
security-interoperability) by proposing a predefined message format and a 
predefined messaging architecture. A few critical success factors (CSFs) were 
identified during this study. These are discussed in the sequence in which the 
framework developed; CSFs are indicated in italics.
ebXML was used as a point-of-departure for the proposed framework. The 
primary aim of ebXML was to use standardized XML, a system-independent 
language, within an open architecture for conducting electronic business 
(Rawlins, 2001).  The use of CPPs and CPAs are used in ebXML to negotiate 
protocols, e.g for communication and security, and business processes. A CPP 
describes the security and communication profiles of a company. Allowing 
different companies to define their own profiles should inevitably result in a vast 
number of possible permutations of protocols.
By standardizing on a predefined protocol-profile, every participant within 
the proposed framework would use the same, standardized protocols. This would 
be tantamount to a global CPA. 
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The uniform use of standard security mechanisms, e.g. XML encryption 
and XML signatures, are proposed to cater for security requirements within the 
GMHS. In Chapter 5 these technologies were discussed and in Chapter 9 the 
implementation requirements, e.g. the use of standardized algorithms, were 
proposed. Chapter 7 discussed state-of-the-art VPN technologies, IPSec and SSL, 
as a means to secure the actual pathway of messages traveling through un-trusted 
networks. A standardized security solution for the “VPN” pathways within the 
global marketplace is suggested: a predefined SSL configuration for GMHS to 
GMHS, and IPSec for internal networks.
Using a standardized addressing protocol (Chapter 3), which allows for 
synchronous and asynchronous messaging, ensures better accessibility to 
communication in instance of failure, because messages will be queued until the 
designated system becomes available. Implementing reliable messaging (Chapter 
4) within the proposed framework guarantees the delivery of messages. This 
ensures that all messages are successfully delivered at their destinations.
HTTP is proposed as the common transfer protocol within the proposed 
framework, unlike with the openness of ebXML, which promotes a protocol-
neutral environment (Rawlins, 2001).
It is contended here that the proposed GMHS framework can be the first
step towards secure interoperable integration in a global context. Ferris et al. 
(2003) suggests a widely used pattern which helps in achieving performance, 
robustness and integrity goals. This pattern introduces a messaging middleware 
component at each communication endpoint which is called an endpoint manager. 
These endpoint managers can accept message delivery requests from one or more 
applications, provide for the reliable delivery or messages to their destination, and 
deliver received messages to the appropriate applications. The endpoint managers 
encapsulate the complexity of the messaging, which reduces complexity of the 
application code. It was thus deemed possible to design a common, secure 
messaging architecture to promote global interoperability, based on a common 
message handler. 
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The proposed GMHS therefore is posited as an endpoint manager in a 
secure and standardized fashion. It can scale to a global electronic market, using 
predefined standards such as discussed in this research.
Having addressed the above-mentioned CSFs with formulations based on 
a thorough literature research of the related technologies, it is concluded that the 
proposed framework is a feasible starting point for messaging models in a global 
context.
10.2 Future Development Areas
Standardized business processes and business documents are not covered 
in this dissertation. Secure messaging-communication (technical) interoperability 
can be achieved by using the proposed framework, but it is important that 
business processes and documents be standardized to achieve interoperability at 
the business level.
Other areas requiring further research:
 Standardized generic security policies need to be created to specify 
the security requirements, as given in this dissertation, in an 
electronic format.
 It is important to guarantee some degree of trust when conducting 
business in a global electronic market. How can this trust be 
electronically determined without human intervention?
 The Secure-Conversation specification can be implemented for 
establishing and sharing security contexts, and deriving session 
keys from security contexts.
 Reliable-Messaging Policies are necessary that will handle the 
proposed choreography of a reliable message exchange.
 Authentication mechanisms, such as SAML, can be incorporated 
within the framework for advanced authentication purposes, 
instead of basing authentication on digital certificates.
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It is modestly concluded that this proposed framework can benefit both 
researchers and practitioners working on secure open source, standardized 
messaging environments.
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ABSTRACT: Web services are generally accepted as the most interoperable 
application interface today on the Web. In the context of a global electronic 
marketplace this is an essential factor. In keeping with Services-Oriented 
Architecture trends, a Web service-based Message Service Handler can provide a 
global service to all participants in the global marketplace. The main objective of 
this research is to design a Web service to provide Message Handler Services, 
using ebXML as the point-of-departure. The focus of this paper is to arrive at a set 
of pre-specified security standards to promote the goal of interoperability, 
explaining, with justification, which security mechanisms should be used within 
the proposed Web service model. The Web service will send messages using the 
SOAP with Attachments architecture. The use of XML signatures and XML 
encryption within this SOAP envelope is advised to ensure integrity, 
authentication and confidentiality. When the actual SOAP envelope is transmitted 
over the Internet, it will be wrapped within an IPSec packet to ensure further 
security.
KEY WORDS: Message Service Handler, Web service, ebXML, IPSec, 
TLS/SSL, XKMS, XACML, SOAP, XML Encryption, XML Signatures, WS 
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SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS IN A GLOBAL 
MESSAGE SERVICE HANDLER DESIGN 
(RESEARCH IN PROGRESS)
1. INTRODUCTION
In a world where more and more business transactions occur electronically, using 
the Internet as a transport medium, interoperability and security have become very 
important. Interoperability provides for the seamless integration and 
interoperation between internal and external enterprise applications which might 
consist of autonomous, heterogeneous, and distributed components that form part 
of loosely coupled and/or tightly coupled systems (Bouguettaya et al, 1998). To 
promote interoperability, the use of the same protocols and standards are 
important to allow different systems to communicate with each other. Web 
services have become very popular and can been seen as a solution to address 
interoperability issues.
Fundamentally, a Web service can be seen as a service that is accessible 
over the Internet. However, the term is more far-reaching and refers to the 
architecture, standards, technology and business models that make a Web service 
possible. IBM (2001) defines a Web service as a new breed of Web applications. 
It is stated that they are self-contained, self-describing, modular applications that 
can be published, located, and invoked across the Web. Web services perform 
functions, which can be anything from simple requests to complicated business 
processes. Gardner (2001) states that Web services are interoperable building 
blocks which are used for constructing applications. The Web services 
architecture enables applications to connect to other applications.
Gardner (2001) states that Web services architectures need to address 
discovery, authentication, authorization, and business models for accessing 
intellectual property. Another issue is the interaction with services once they are 
accessed. One needs to know how to present the resource such that these issues 
are addressed. Gardner (2001) states that the infrastructure for presenting the 
resource is well established; it involves sending a MIME type with a document 
and then using an application that knows how to deal with that document type. A 
problem which was brought up with services is that there are potentially many 
more types of services than types of document and that the interactions with Web 
services are more complex. The Web services architecture therefore requires 
clients to know in advance the type of service that they will be using.
To ensure interoperability, certain standards have been developed. These 
standards will be described in the next section. In section 3, the purpose of a 
Message Service Handler (MSH) is discussed, followed by a proposed model 
explaining the need for a MSH in a global electronic marketplace.
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2. INTEROPERABILITY AND SECURITY STANDARDS
In this section the focus is on standards that are available to ensure 
interoperability and the required security measurements.
2.1 Web Service Description Language (WSDL)
Communication protocols and message formats are becoming more standardized 
in the Web community. The need arises for the importunateness that these 
communications must be described in some structured way. WSDL (2001) 
addresses this need by defining an XML grammar for describing network services 
as collections of communication endpoints capable of exchanging messages. 
Within these XML grammar definitions, one will find documentation for 
distributed systems which serve as a recipe for automating the details involved in 
application communications.
2.2 Universal Description, Discovery and Integration (UDDI)
A Web service can only be meaningful if potential users can find appropriate 
information about how to execute them. According to the UDDI Specification 
(UDDI, 2002) the focus of UDDI is the definition of a set of services supporting 
the description and discovery of businesses, organizations, and other Web 
services providers, the Web services they make available, and the technical 
interfaces which may be used to access those services. UUDI is based on a 
common set of industry standards such as HTTP, XML, XML Schema, and 
SOAP. UDDI provides an interoperable, foundational infrastructure for a Web 
services-based software environment for both publicly available services and 
services only exposed internally within an organization.
2.3 Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP)
SOAP is described by Medjahed et al (2003) as a lightweight messaging 
framework for exchanging XML-formatted data among Web services, which 
functions using a variety of transport protocols (e.g. HTTP, SMTP, FTP). Web 
services use SOAP as a messaging protocol. This adoption of XML-based 
messaging facilitates interaction between heterogeneous systems.
Drummond (2001) explains that the SOAP framework begins with a 
normal MIME envelope within which a XML namespace-qualified SOAP 
envelope is encapsulated. ebXML extends this MIME structure by using the 
multipart/related framework used by SOAP with Attachments to include 
additional payload data. 
A major design goal for SOAP is simplicity and extensibility, according to 
the SOAP Specification (SOAP, 2000). SOAP messages are fundamentally one-
way transmissions from a sender to a receiver, but SOAP messages are often 
combined to be used as request/response messages. SOAP messages can be set to 
many different exchange patterns e.g. one way, request/response, multicast, etc.
In terms of security, SOAP does implement some methods for integrity and 
privacy protection; primarily, signatures are used within messages.
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2.4 SAML
While current technologies enable an e-business to authenticate users and manage 
user access privileges, it takes considerable effort and cost to extend these 
capabilities across an enterprise or share them among trading partners. According 
RSA (2003), the Security Assertions Markup Language (SAML) addresses this 
challenge. SAML is an XML-based framework that enables Web services to 
readily exchange information relating to authentication and authorization. This 
information takes the form of trusted statements, called security assertions, about 
end users, Web services, or any other entity that can be assigned a digital identity.
There are three major types of SAML assertions.
 Authentication assertions, which are issued by an authentication service, 
declare that the identity of a user or a Web service has been authenticated 
to access protected resources, for example, an intranet or extranet.
 Attribute assertions, generated by an attribute service, verify that a user or 
Web service possesses certain static attributes (e.g., job role or company 
affiliation) or dynamic attributes (such as a consumer’s bank account 
balance or a reseller’s quarterly sales volume to date). Attribute 
information is vital to the process of assigning Web access privileges.
 An authorization service brings together authentication assertions, 
attribute assertions and authorization policies and generates authorization 
assertions that define which resources a user/service is entitled to access. 
Because SAML shields applications from the complexity of the 
underlying authentication and authorization systems, it has the flexibility 
to address a range of interoperability challenges, both today and in future 
environments. SAML is already being used for authorization in higher 
education institutions and on the public Internet.
2.5 XACML
Griffin (2004) states that the Extensible Access Control Markup Language, or 
XACML promises to standardize policy management and access decisions. 
XACML can be used to define a general policy language to protect resources as 
well as act as an access decision language. Therefore, if a user wants to access a 
resource, an authorization process is performed. This makes it a key component in 
the development of authorization infrastructures and a foundational step in the 
creation of federated authentication environment.
Olavsrud (2003) states that according to Sun, XACML has a number of 
advantages over other access control policy languages, including:
 One standard access control policy language can replace dozens of 
application-specific languages
 Administrators save time and money because they do not need to 
rewrite their policies in many different languages
 Developers save time and money because they do not have to invent 
new policy languages and write code to support them; they can reuse 
existing code
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 Good tools for writing and managing XACML policies will be 
developed, since they can be used with many applications
 XACML is flexible enough to accommodate most access control 
policy needs and extensible so that new requirements can be 
supported
 One XACML policy can cover many resources; this helps avoid 
inconsistent policies on different resources
 XACML allows one policy to refer to another; this is important for 
large organizations, for instance, a site-specific policy may refer to a 
company-wide policy and a country-specific policy.
A downfall mentioned by Griffin (2004), is the fact that XACML can 
increase system overhead; in an example given - a Web page which aggregates 
many resources – an XACML request is required for each resource.
2.6 XKMS
It is stated by Salz (2003) that public-key infrastructures (PKI’s) are well suited 
for securing Web services, but PKI deployment is too cumbersome and costly for 
the technology to achieve widespread use. The XML Key Management 
Specification borrows the best of PKI without reducing scalability or security. 
According to XML Trust Centre (2004), the purpose of XKMS is to define a Web 
services interface for a public key infrastructure. This makes it easy for 
applications to interface with key-related services, like registration and 
revocation, and location and validation. Developers only need to implement 
XKMS clients, because XKMS server components are mostly implemented by 
PKI providers. XKMS is a solution for secure Web services, enabling Web 
services to register and manage cryptographic keys used for digital signatures and 
encryption.
2.7 WS-Security
The WS-Security Specification (2004) (Web Services Security), proposes a 
standard set of SOAP extensions that can be used when building secure Web 
services to implement integrity and confidentiality. This provides quality of 
protection through message integrity, message confidentiality, and single message 
authentication. These mechanisms can be used to accommodate a wide variety of 
security models and encryption technologies. WS-Security is flexible and is 
designed to be used as the basis for the construction of a wide variety of security 
models. The specification provides three main mechanisms, namely security 
token propagation, message integrity, and message confidentiality. By 
themselves, these mechanisms do not provide a complete security solution. 
Instead, WS-Security is a building block that can be used in conjunction with 
other Web service extensions and higher-level application-specific protocols to 
accommodate a wide variety of security models and encryption technologies.
2.8 XML-Signatures
In an article published by Simon, Madsen, and Adams (2001), it is said that 
security technologies implemented by common developments are not enough for 
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securing business transactions over the Web. Browser security is not enhanced or 
flexible enough to protect highly sensitive B2B transactions. Transport security 
protocols, such as Transport Layer Security/Secure Sockets Layer (TLS/SSL), are 
sufficient to protect a transaction while en-route, but the transaction components 
are not protected when it is stored on a server (which might be public). The need 
exists for message authentication, integrity and non-repudiation. The globally 
recognized method for satisfying these requirements for secure business 
transactions is to use digital certificates to enable the encryption and digital 
signing of the exchanged data. XML signatures are digital signatures designed for 
use in XML transactions. A useful feature of XML-signatures is that it enables 
one to sign selective parts of a message. Different sections of an XML document 
can be signed by different signatures (Simon et al., 2001).
2.9 XML-Encryption
Using XML Encryption, certain parts of the message can be encrypted. Siddiqui 
(2002) states that both encrypted and non-encrypted data can be exchanged within 
the same document. Another benefit of XML Encryption is that it can handle both 
XML and non-XML (e.g. binary) data. The encryption is done with symmetric 
encryption after a secret key is generated using asymmetric encryption. The 
encryption of certain parts of a message is important when confidential 
information must not be revealed to certain intermediaries when the message is 
processed.
XML Signatures and XML Encryption work on the same basic principle.
2.10 IPSec
IPsec, short for IP Security, is a set of open standard protocols developed by the 
Internet Engineering Task Force IETF to support secure exchange of packets at 
the IP layer (network layer)(Cisco Systems, 2002). This provides security for 
transmission of sensitive information over unprotected networks such as the 
Internet. IPsec has been deployed widely to implement Virtual Private Networks 
(VPNs).
Tunnelling can be achieved using the Authentication Header (AH) protocol 
or Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP). Encryption can be enforced as high as 
256-bit AES (Nortel Networks, 2003). Two encryption modes exist (Cisco
Systems, 2002). In tunnel mode, both the headers and payload are encrypted. In 
transport mode, IP headers remain unencrypted, but payloads are encrypted. (In 
tunnel mode, the inner IP header is also encrypted.) However, with transport 
mode the risk of traffic analysis is possible.
2.11 TLS/SSL
TLS/SSL is a popular protocol for securing HTTP traffic. The TLS/SSL protocol 
suite encrypts communications between Web servers and Web browsers for 
tunnelling over the Internet at the application layer. TLS/SSL make use of 
standards-based encryption and authentication, and provide secure access to data 
and applications over the Web (Nortel Networks, 2003). No specific software is 
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required to make use of TLS/SSL, because it is generally integrated into an 
application, e.g. a Web browser.
It is stated by Kurlekar (2003) that TLS/SSL uses public-and-private key 
encryption, which also includes the use of digital certificates. Two-way 
authentication is not available. This result in anyone who has a correct username 
and password being able to access a TLS/SSL virtual private network.
Problems with TLS/SSL are that it affects network throughput, because 
cryptographic processing is very much CPU-intensive, and TLS/SSL is not 
protected against traffic analysis (Canavan, 2001).
3. MESSAGE SERVICE HANDLER BASED ON THE EBXML MODEL
Kiely (2001) writes that the main aim of 
Electronic business eXtensible Markup 
Language (ebXML), which is supported by the 
United Nations as a standard for E-business, is 
to create a single online marketplace where 
companies of any size or nationality can 
collaborate and conduct business around the 
globe. ebXML can be thought of as the 
successor to electronic data interchange (EDI). 
ebXML specifies common business processes 
and an architecture for carrying out those EDI 
processes over the Internet. ebXML provides 
interoperability within and between ebXML-
compliant trading-partner applications and 
maximizes efficiency.
The Message Service Handler (MSH) in 
ebXML handles all the incoming and outgoing 
messages. All communication within ebXML 
must take place via the MSH. The MSH 
interfaces with an application that 
processes/generate messages. The MSH will 
perform authentication, authorisation, 
encryption and packaging actions on messages 
and sends them over specified protocols to a 
receiving MSH. The MSH also provides a 
means for error-handling.
In the current ebXML specification, it is 
not mandated how the MSH must be implemented. It is assumed that not all the 
functionality has to be implemented. All MSH implementations must comply with 
functions supported in a corresponding MSH, to enable them to communicate 
with each other. If a function is not implemented, the MSH must provide an error 
notification stating that the functionality is requested but not supported.
In the ebXML Message Specification (ebMS, 2002), it is dictated that the 
ebXML Messaging Service be conceptually broken down into the following three 
parts:
Figure 1: Relationship 
between ebXML MSH 
Components (ebMS, 2002)
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1. an abstract Service Interface
2. functions provided by the MSH
3. mapping to underlying transport services
Figure 1 shows a logical arrangement of the functional modules existing 
within one possible implementation of the ebXML Message Services architecture. 
These modules are arranged in a manner to indicate their inter-relationships and 
dependencies.
The Header Processing module handles the creation of the ebXML Header 
elements for the ebXML Message, using input from the ebXML application, 
passed through the Message Service Interface, information from the agreed 
Collaboration Protocol Agreement (CPA) governing the message and generated 
information such as digital signature, timestamps and unique identifiers.
The Header Parsing process extracts or transforms information from a 
received ebXML message's Header element into one or other form suitable for 
processing by the MSH implementation.
Security Services: the message service handler can include digital 
signature creation and verification, encryption, authentication and authorization. 
Security services can be implemented by other components of the MSH including 
the Header Processing and Header Parsing components.
The Reliable Messaging Service is responsible for the delivery and 
acknowledgment of ebXML Messages. The service includes handling for 
persistence, retry, error notification and acknowledgment of messages requiring 
reliable delivery.
The Message Packaging module in the message service handler is where 
the final enveloping of an ebXML Message (ebXML header elements and 
payload) into its SOAP Messages with Attachments container occurs.
The Error Handling component handles the reporting of errors 
encountered during MSH or Application processing of a message.
A Message Service Interface is an abstract service interface applications 
used to interact with the MSH to send and receive messages and which the MSH 
uses to interface with applications handling received messages.
Stamps (2003) lists the following as design goals for the MSH. It should be:
 Based on standards: XML, XSLT, HTTP, SMTP, SOAP
 Flexible and adaptable processing
 An open framework for customer-specific processing
 Use native XML as much as possible
 Allow integration of existing middleware
 Support legacy integration
 Provide encryption and signature support (XML signature, XML 
encryption)
 Provide easy security integration
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 Support access to repositories (UDDI, ebXML repository)
4. A PROPOSED MODEL
The main goal of this research is to design a Web service that will facilitate 
messaging in a global electronic market, ensuring interoperability. As mentioned 
in section 3, the implementation of the MSH is not mandated. This allows 
developers to create implementations according to their own will, which will lead 
to interoperability issues, because each MSH will be based upon different 
standards. By creating a Web service which facilitates the functionality of the 
MSH, interoperability issues will be less, developers do not need to create their 
own message handlers (Web services act as building blocks for creating 
applications) and the service will be based upon the most appropriate standards. 
The standards discussed in this paper will primarily be considered within this 
proposed Web service. The use of specific standards and protocols will be 
suggested; implementations of gateways, which are used to translate between 
different protocols, can be very costly and could lead to further interoperability 
problems.
The Web service will essentially perform message handling during 
electronic business transactions. It will be responsible for the generation of a well-
structured message envelope, including the necessary security measures to 
guarantee the safety and validity of a specific message.
The message handling Web service will require having certain specific 
features – some of which will mentioned briefly, as this research is in a very early 
stage. For instance, the Web service must be downloadable onto a company’s 
network to be integrated into their trading system. An adversary might want to 
create a denial of service attack on a specific company’s system; therefore 
methods must be available to counter such attacks. Digital signatures can be used 
to validate a message. If messages are received from the same IP address and the 
same signature, those messages must be able to be filtered by a firewall or a 
similar countermeasure procedure.
If a company wants to send a message to a trading partner, an XML 
document will be created by an upper-layer application (which might be another 
Web service) that does not form part of the proposed Web service. If it is
considered that security must be enforced within the document, it is solely up to 
this upper-layer application which creates the document to implement this level of 
security. For example, the upper-layer application might use WS-Security, 
SAML, XACML, XKMS, XML signatures and XML encryption within the XML 
document, but the proposed Web service will only accept the XML documents 
and attach it to the message. The Web service must be able to validate these 
documents according to a public XML schema document that represents a 
specific industry component. This XML document will be placed within a secure 
SOAP envelope for transmission.
Once the Web service is developed, the functionality and interaction with 
a service need to be described so that users know how to interact with these 
services. WSDL and UDDI are standards developed to describe and present the 
services.
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As mentioned in section 3, the use of XML is recommended within a 
MSH, because of its flexible structure. The SOAP framework extends this 
flexibility, by allowing developers to create their own methods. Within the 
proposed Web service, these methods will be restricted to providing basic 
connection, choreography details, specified security measurements and the 
provision of MIME attachments.
Figure 2 shows a proposed SOAP 
message architecture. Italics indicate 
attributes and normal font indicates elements. 
In the SOAP Header, the MessageHeader 
element includes the version attribute, which 
indicates an id for a schema document that 
was used to create the attached message. 
These documents will be stored on a 
registry/repository. All the elements and their 
contents must be understood by the receiving 
process otherwise an error message will be 
created. ConversationId is a string identifying 
related messages that are part of a 
conversation. The service element specifies 
the service that must act on the message and 
the action element specifies the process of the 
service that must process the message. The 
service and action element values must 
conform to those specified in the business 
processes which are stored on the (ebXML) 
repository. MessageData uniquely identifies 
the (ebXML) messages. 
DuplicateElimination will prevent messages 
from being processed more than once. An 
MSH has to keep track of messages received 
in order to eliminate already received 
messages. The description element is a 
textual description of the message’s intent. 
The signature element contains the XML 
digital signature of the sender. The CPAId 
element, which is a reference to the Collaboration Protocol Agreement (CPA), 
will be omitted from the message architecture, because only certain protocols are 
allowed to be used, therefore it is not necessary to have a CPA between trading 
partners. This protocol agreement, according to ebXML standards, is created by 
combining two companies’ CPP’s (Collaboration Protocol Profiles). These CPP’s 
contain information about standards used by those specific companies. The CPA 
is a mutual agreement on the same standards to be used. If there is no agreement 
on which standards are going to be used, no communication will be able to take 
place.  Using the proposed Web service, it will not be necessary to create CPA’s.
Figure 2: Proposed SOAP 
message architecture
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The SOAP body includes one element, the manifest. The manifest element 
can contain multiple reference elements that link to the message payloads with 
textual descriptions of each payload. These payloads are possible by using the 
SOAP with Attachments standard.
To secure the SOAP message, the WS-Security recommends XML 
Signatures and XML Encryption. The message service handler will implement 
XML Signatures and encryption for the entire message. XKMS will be used for 
the management of the relevant keys. 
The SOAP message generated by the Web service will be transported 
using TCP, with HTTP as the main application layer protocols.
HTTP 1.1 is a synchronous protocol that attempts immediate delivery. If 
delivery is not possible, an error will occur. An HTTP-server might be 
unavailable, because it is down or has too many queries to process. The sender 
will have to check regularly for availability, and this can lead to high overhead.
To avoid problems like this, it would be convenient to implement a 
message queue where messages will be stored until they can be processed. This 
can be accomplished by implementing HTTP with message-queuing-and-
forwarding where HTTP will act as an asynchronous protocol.
The proposed Web service will cater for error-checking, error-handling 
and auditing at application level.
In ebXML, the digital signatures are implemented to protect the integrity 
and origin of messages (ebMS, 2002), but there are still vulnerabilities present. 
The impact of the vulnerability depends on the deployment environment and the 
transport mechanisms used to exchange these messages.
MIME is used as the framework for the message package, containing the 
SOAP envelope and any payload containers. Various SOAP envelope elements 
make reference to the payloads identified via the MIME mechanisms. The MIME 
Content-ID: header is used to specify a unique, identifying label for each payload. 
The label is used in the SOAP Envelope to identify the payload whenever it is 
needed. The MIME headers are not protected, even when an XML-based digital 
signature is applied. An ebXML message may be at risk depending on how the 
information in the MIME headers is processed as compared to the information in 
the SOAP Envelope. The Content-ID: MIME header is critical. An adversary 
could easily mount a denial-of-service attack by mixing and matching payloads 
with the Content-ID: headers. As with most denial-of-service attacks there are no 
specific protections offered for this vulnerability. An adversary could change the 
MIME headers while a message is en route from its origin to its destination and 
this would not be detected when the security services are validated. This threat is 
less significant in a peer-to-peer transport environment as compared to a multi-
hop transport environment.
However, the solution seems to be relatively simple. All messaging using 
TCP is generally packaged in an Internet Protocol (IP) packet. By implementing 
Secure IP (IPSec, the VPN protocol of choice) at the network layer, secure 
”tunneling” between trading partners can be ensured. HTTP messages - which 
may include SOAP messages, with or without MIME attachments (SOAP 
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payloads) will then travel in this secure tunnel. The MIME headers would then be 
protected within an IPSec packet.
In IPSec tunnel mode the whole message is encrypted, whereas using the 
transport mode, only the payload is encrypted. The secure tunnel mode should, 
ideally, be used to send messages between trading partner, because then 
adversaries would not be able to obtain information from the MIME and SOAP 
Headers. This type of encryption results in node-to-node encryption. However, 
each receiving device would have to be an IPsec-compliant device to decrypt each 
packet. If the package is not at its destination it must be re-encrypted and 
forwarded to the next receiving device. Each receiving device has to have the 
sender’s public key for its digital certificate. Thus, transport mode, with the traffic 
analysis vulnerability, is the more practical choice (providing end-to-end 
encryption). IPSec provides privacy, authentication and data integrity of IP 
packets (Phaltankar, 2000).
IPSec is considered by Budd and Gray (2002) to be more secure than 
TLS/SSL. They also state that IPSec can make use of maximum 168-bit Triple 
DES, whereas TLS/SSL uses maximum 128-bit RC4 encryption. It is said 
furthermore that TLS/SSL provides an inferior implementation of authentication 
than IPSec, because it makes use of client software. A feature of IPSec is that new 
algorithms, e.g. 256-bit AES encryption, can be added as they are developed.
5. CONCLUSION
In this paper the focus is on designing a secure Web service that will facilitate 
messaging within a global electronic business market.
A message structure is envisaged that will contain the business documents 
as payloads (refer to section 4) which is possible through the implementation of 
the SOAP with Attachments standard.  Actual SOAP messages will carry business 
document payloads and be sent through an IPSec secure tunnel. XML Signatures 
and Encryption at the application level will be recommended to ensure security 
within the message payload. The IP-packets containing the SOAP message will be 
secured to ensure authentication, confidentiality, data integrity, non-repudiation 
and anti-replay protection.
Much research still needs to be conducted, but a design is being planned 
that will create an enhanced Message Handler Web service, that implements the 
most appropriate industry standards. A generic template from which configuration 
items may be selected for processing by both ends is being considered in order to 
make the Message Handler service universally applicable.
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